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Explaining Donald Trump’s Support: Cultural Lag or Cultural
Backlash?
By
Katherine Rocha, Chris Sabetta and Roger Clark
Rhode Island College
Abstract
The authors employ Ogburn’s (1922) concept of cultural lag to gain insight into why Donald Trump’s supporters
voted for him in the 2016 Presidential election. Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark posit that economic and technological
changes created a sense of ill being, or malaise, among a large portion of the white working class and that this
malaise made voters unusually susceptible to the populist themes of the Trump candidacy. The authors analyze
Gallup’s (2017) “State of the States” poll results for 2016 to examine the degree to which Trump’s margin of victory
over Clinton in the 50 states (data from The Cook Political Report 2017) can be explained by the variables of 1)
the percentage of state residents who identify as Republican or who identify as independent but say they lean
Republican and 2) a state’s score on Gallup’s overall “Well-Being” index.” This index is comprised of five elements
of well-being that are the core components of the best possible life: purpose, social, financial, community and
physical.” The authors report that, at the state level, once the degree to which a population identified as Republican
was controlled, there was a strong, negative correlation between its overall well being and Trump’s electoral
margins. Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark use the American National Election study data from 2016 and 2012, at the
individual level, to show that the 2016 election was unusually influenced by attitudes that constituted a kind of
cultural backlash to progressive viewpoints about blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians, and women. The data
show that these attitudes had stronger controlled associations with a vote for Trump than measures of current
economic and educational deprivation.
Keywords: cultural lag, economic insecurity, cultural backlash, populism
INTRODUCTION
Asked why Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential
election, pundits give about as many answers as there
are, well, pundits. Answers include, for example,
Comey’s announcement of the reopening of the Clinton
investigation; Hillary Clinton’s poor candidacy; Mrs.
Clinton’s e-mail scandal; Russian interference in the
election process; the fact that Presidents are not elected
by popular vote; Trump’s supporters’ addiction to “The
Apprentice;” and so on.
Although these answers may each have some validity,
none is particularly sociological. And none feels like
an adequate answer to the basic question: what made

a sufficient slice of the American populace so ready
and perhaps eager to vote for a political novice, with
some evident peccadillos, that any of these peculiarities,
or even some combination of them, could tip the
scale? This really is the central question of this paper,
one that we address through two lenses: a cultural lag
lens and a cultural backlash lens. The former leads
us to believe that support for Trump’s candidacy was
born out of economic insecurity in a substantial part
of the electorate. The latter, that it was the result of
a resentment of a “silent revolution” in attitudes, a
revolution that deprived many whites of their sense of
privilege in American society.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Using the “Cultural Lag” Lens
We thought that the theme of this issue of SBG,
cultural lag, might hold the clue to Donald Trump’s
electoral success. We knew that at least one faction
of Trump supporters (e.g., white working-class men
and their families) had experienced a buffeting by the
winds of economic and technological change. While
such changes also affected working-class people of
other racial and ethnic backgrounds, white workingclass men and their families were more susceptible to
Trump’s campaign themes about job creation and job
security.
The sources of this buffeting have been well
documented. By the 1960s, in fact, the switch to
a knowledge-based economy in the United States
had begun and the industrial economy began to
thin. Managers and engineers, always interested in
increasing productivity, produced automated factories
that employed fewer people. By the 1970s, corporations
began to replace old factories with new ones in countries
with low-cost labor. Initially this loss of manufacturing
jobs hit black men hardest, but by the 1980s the losses
hit less-educated whites as well (Kenschaft, Clark and
Ciambrone 2016: 41-42). The more recent acceleration
of computing power, what Thomas Friedman (2016) calls
“the supernova,” promises to threaten the traditional
working-class job market even more.
The effects of all this economic and technological
change have been uneven in the United States, as
elsewhere. Real family incomes for the top 20 percent
of families rose by a little over 75 percent between 1967
and 2013. Meanwhile those for the next 40 percent
rose by less than 30 percent, and have actually fallen
substantially since 2000, and those for the next 40
percent have risen much less, and also fallen since 2000
(Reeves 2015). Social scientists as politically disparate as
Charles Murray (2012) and Robert Putnam (2015) have
pointed to an increasing bifurcation in the experiences,
opportunities, and prospects for children between what
Murray calls “The New Upper Class” and the “New
Lower Class.” Murray demonstrates convincingly that
this divide is as significant among white Americans as it
is among any other group.
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The relationship between the income inequality
and opportunity inequality has not been simple or
instantaneous. Murray (2012) and Putnam (2015) both
suggest that it took decades for economic troubles
“to undermine family structures and community
supports” (Putnam 2015: 228). As marriage became less
common and divorce more common among the “new
lower class,” children experienced gaps in parenting,
developing lower commitments to education and lower
chances for intergenerational mobility. Fear regarding
and resentment for these situations was natural, as
well as for government actors who continued, as one
of Hochschild’s (2016: 52)) respondents put it, “come
down on the little guy,” over-regulating the little guy, but
under-regulating guys at the top.
In his 2015 book, Our Kids: The American Dream
in Crisis, Putnam under-scored the potential for
“antidemocratic extremism” that the presence of a
new lower class, faced increasingly with few personal
opportunities, but also few opportunities for their
children, poses. As he put it:
[U]nder severe economic and international pressures . .
. the “inert” mass might suddenly prove highly volatile and
open to manipulation by anti-democratic demagogues at the
ideological extremes (pp. 239-240).

So one view of Trump’s victory suggests that
many of his supporters were victims of long-term
economic upheaval in the U. S., seeking to express
their dissatisfaction with the way the country had
left them and their children behind. They voted for
Trump, according to this view, because he spoke to
their economic insecurities and promised to create
the jobs that would enable them to once again achieve
respectable middle-class status for themselves and a
hopeful future for their children. An added benefit
was that Donald Trump promised to shake up the
Washington establishment.
More generally, Donald Trump has been viewed as
embodying the characteristics of a populist candidate,
one who extols the wisdom of “ordinary people” ahead
of the views of elites (e.g., media pundits and elected
politicians). Populism, according to Inglehart and
Norris (2016: 6-7) is a philosophy that often favors
the personal power of charismatic leaders, preferring
direct majoritarian democratic rule over a system of
checks and balances. Donald Trump’s embrace of these
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principles, the cultural lag perspective implies, made groups who seem, through affirmative action programs
him particularly attractive to people with less education, of the federal government, to have been given a leg up
lower levels of income and wealth, and a greater sense in colleges and universities, jobs and welfare programs.
that the economy was failing because it promised to Hochschild summarizes:
address their economic insecurities.
Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers—

Therefore, the cultural lag perspective led us to where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal
propose the following four hypotheses:
sympathy sieve you don’t control or agree with. These are
Hypothesis 1: People with lower incomes would have
been more likely to vote for Trump than people with higher
incomes.
Hypothesis 2: People with less wealth would have been
more likely to vote for Trump than people with more wealth.
Hypothesis 3: People with less education would have
been more likely to vote for Trump than people with more
education.
Hypothesis 4: People who felt the economy was doing
badly would have been more likely to vote for Trump than
people who felt the economy was doing well.

Using the “Cultural Backlash” Lens
“Cultural backlash” refers to a reaction against
progressive cultural movements. The cultural backlash
perspective can be seen as focusing on second-level,
attitudinal implications of economic and technological
change, especially for people who may previously
have seen themselves as privileged in society, but now
feel victimized by liberal movements and attitudes.
This perspective suggests that there has been a “silent
revolution” in values in many Western nations,
coinciding with the rise of knowledge-based economies
(e.g., Inglehart 1977), that has been associated with a
rise of multiculturalism, advocacy for environmental
protection, human rights, and gender equality. Like
many such “revolutions,” this one has inspired a
backlash most particularly among those who have seen
their privilege and status challenged by liberals and by
economic change. These revolutions have left many
whites feeling, as Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) book title
states, Strangers in Their Own Land.
Hochschild’s qualitative research into the lives and
convictions of conservatives, who, in her study, were
largely white, uncovers deep-seated fears of being
culturally eclipsed. Her Louisiana respondents did in
fact fear economic decline, but were conceivably even
more motivated by resentments about “line cutters,”

opportunities you’d have loved to have had in your day—and
either you should have had them when you were young or
the young shouldn’t be getting them now. It’s not fair (2016:
137).

Hochschild is careful about labeling her respondents,
and by extension other, primarily white, conservatives,
as racist, sexist, anti-immigrant or homophobic. Many,
she implies, probably are racist by definitions used by
sociologists—e.g., believers “in a natural hierarchy that
places blacks at the bottom” (2016: 147). She points out,
however, that most are explicitly not racist by their own
definitions of the word—people who use the “N” word
or who hate blacks. We too would like to avoid such
labels.
Donald Trump spoke to the sense of unfairness felt
by many “new lower class” whites. He openly criticized
immigrants from Mexico and Muslim countries, and
was cheered. Openly demanded that “Black Lives
Matter” protesters be kicked out of his rallies, and
garnered vocal crowd support. Hochschild makes this
observation about a rally she observed:
He [Trump] was throwing off not only a set of “politically
correct” attitudes, but a set of feeling rules—that is, a set of
ideas about the right way to feel regarding blacks, women,
immigrants, gays . . . (2016: 227).

The cultural backlash perspective led us to propose a
number of other hypotheses about the 2016 presidential
election. Specifically, we came to expect:
Hypothesis 5: People who feel that blacks have not been
particularly disadvantaged are more likely than others to
have voted for Trump.
Hypothesis 6: People who would like to halt immigration
into the country are more likely than others to have voted for
Trump.
Hypothesis 7: People who feel that discrimination against
gays and lesbians is tolerable are more likely than others to
have voted for Trump.
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Hypothesis 8: People who feel that discrimination against
women is tolerable are more likely to have voted for Trump
than others.

Our reading of the cultural lag and cultural backlash
perspectives together led us to believe that, at the state
level, those state populations expressing the greatest
overall well being would be less likely to vote for Trump
than those expressing the least overall well being.
Hence, we proposed our last (ninth) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9: At the state level, Trump’s margin of
victory will have been inversely related to the proportion
of the population expressing a sense of overall well being,
even once the proportion of the population of the population
classifying itself as Republican is controlled.

RESEARCH APPROACH and PRINCIPAL
VARIABLES
This article is based primarily on secondary analysis
of two timely data sets: Gallup’s (2017) “State of the
States” poll results for 2016 and the American National
Election Study (ANES) for 2016 and 2012.1 We use the
Gallup data to determine the degree to which Trump’s
margin of victory (or defeat) over Clinton in the 50
states (data from The Cook Political Report, 2017) can
be explained by two variables: the percentage of state
residents who identify as Republican or who identify
as independent but say they lean toward Republican
and a state’s score on Gallup’s overall “Well-Being”
index, “made up of five elements of well-being that are
the core components of the best possible life: purpose,
social, financial, community and physical.” Our goal
is to ascertain the degree to which a lack of “wellbeing,” the closest measure of state-wide despair we
have found, can account for Trump’s success, above and
beyond what could have expected based on the political
identification of states’ populations.
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rather than at the state, level may have contributed to
Trump’s electoral success. We choose indicators based
on their availability in both the 2012 presidential
election, involving primarily Mitt Romney and Barack
Obama and in order to estimate their relative salience
in the 2016 election. Comparing the two elections is
crucial for determining the degree to which certain
characteristics and attitudes stand out in the 2016
election. Thus, for instance, even if we find that a
concern about immigrants distinguished Trump voters
from Clinton voters, we cannot be sure that this attitude
was particularly salient in the 2016 election unless we
can determine that it was less important in previous
elections.
Our dependent variable in the 2016 election is
whether a respondent voted for Clinton (coded 0) or
Trump (coded 1). Our dependent variable in the 2012
election is whether s/he voted for Obama (coded 0) or
Romney (coded 1).
We use four measures of economic status and possible
insecurity as independent variables. Three of these tap
respondents’ economic condition and the fourth, an
attitude towards the economy. The first independent
variable is a measure of family income (INCOME).2
The second independent variable is a rough measure
of wealth, based on whether a respondent claimed to
own stock or not (STOCK). The third independent
variable is a measure of education (EDUCATION).3 The
fourth independent variable is a measure of economic
condition (ECONOMY).4 The cultural lag perspective
leads us to expect that people with lower family income,
without stocks, with less education and with negative
ratings of the economy are more likely to have voted for
Trump than people with higher incomes, with stocks,
with more education and with positive ratings of the
economy.
We also have four measures of the degree to which
respondents are gripped by a negative reaction to
progressive value changes—that is, are part of a cultural

Since 1948, ANES has employed a sample of
American voters in every presidential election in order 2
INCOME has 28 categories, ranging from “under $5,000” to
to help researchers determine the characteristics and “$250,000 or more.”
attitudes of voters that led to the election result in
each presidential election. We use the ANES data to 3 EDUCATION has five categories, ranging from “less than a high
determine how various indicators of voter economic school credential” to “a graduate degree.”
insecurity and cultural backlash, at the individual, 4
The ANES data were available through Berkeley University’s
(2017) “Survey Documentation and Analysis” website.
1

ECONOMY is operationalized by a respondent’s rating of the
economy on a five-category scale from “very good” to “very bad.”
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backlash against certain categories of people. One Republicans, whites, males, older voters, and people
measure has to do with the degree to which they disagree who said religion was important would be more likely
with the statement that “Blacks have gotten less than to vote for Trump than non-Republicans, non-whites,
they deserve” (BLACKS). A second measure focuses females, younger voters and people who said religion
on the degree to which they think the media should was not important.
pay less attention to discrimination against women
(WOMEN).5 A third measure is whether they say “no”
RESULTS
to the question “should laws protect gays and lesbians
from job discrimination” (GAYS). And the fourth
We report results from Pearson correlation and
measure, a four-category scale measuring the degree
to which respondents think that government should linear regression analyses for overwhelming theoretical
define unauthorized immigrants as felons and send considerations, despite the fact that many of our
them back to their home countries (IMMIGRANTS). variables do not meet the assumptions required of such
9
Unfortunately, in regard to measuring anti-immigrant statistical techniques. Normally, it would be preferable
feeling, this last variable does not have the greatest to use logit or probit regression analysis, for instance,
face validity in the 2016 ANES survey. An alternative when the dependent variable is dichotomous, especially
measure of this variable was available in the 2016. We when one of the categories of the variable is relatively
could not use the alternative variable because there was rare. But rarity is not a problem for the dependent
no comparable indicator present in the 2012 survey.6 variables in this analysis: all four candidates—Trump,
However, analyses not presented here suggest that the Clinton, Romney and Obama—received substantial
more valid, alternative measure of anti-immigrant proportions of the votes. And simple linear regression
feeling actually shows a stronger association with provides statistics—in this case, standardized regression
presidential choice than IMMIGRANT, so using the coefficients (betas)—that enable the comparison of
variable IMMIGRANT in our analysis probably offers the strength of controlled associations of various
a conservative estimate of the degree to which anti- independent variables on the dependent variable. These
are crucial comparisons for this study. In analyses not
immigrant sentiment drove Trump voters.
reported in this paper, we have done logit regression
We use five control variables in our analyses: political and find that results are stable over the two types of
party affiliation; race; gender; age; and the importance regression regime (i.e., for simple linear and logit
of religion to the respondent.7 Republicans were regression).
undoubtedly more likely to vote for Trump than voters
Our initial research question had to do with how
with other political identifications.8 We expected that
much of Trump’s margins at the state level, which is,
5
We want to point out that the wording of this statement may after all, how elections are decided, could be accounted
needlessly confuse voter attitudes towards women with their
for in terms of general malaise, dissatisfaction or
attitudes towards the media as well as their attitudes towards
Hillary Clinton, a female candidate. However, we found no more despair among the electorate. We therefore regressed
reliable indicator of attitudes towards women in the 2016 and 2012 Trump’s margin at the state level on two variables:
one, the percentage of state residents self-identifying
6
One variable (available in 2016), based on a question about what as Republican; the other, the index measuring overall
should happen to United States immigration levels (from “increase
wellbeing. As Table 1 suggests, once the percentage
them a lot” to “decrease them a lot”) does not confuse, as the
variable IMMIGRANTS might be seen to do, attitudes towards
immigration with attitudes towards illegal immigration.

Political party affiliation is coded as Republican = 1 and not
Republican = 0. Self-identified race is coded as 1 = white and 0 =
not white. Gender (GENDER) is coded as 1 = female and 0 = male.
Age (AGE) is coded as age in years; and the importance of religion
to the respondent (RELIGION) is coded as 1 = religion important
and 0 = religion not important.
7

We had a choice between two variables: one measured the
degree to which voters considered themselves Republican (with
strong Republicans being on one end of a 7-category scale and
strong Democrats being on the other); one measured whether they
identified as Republican or not. As it turns out, findings do not
substantially differ when either indicator is used, but we use the
latter in the analyses presented here.
8

Quite a few of the variables we analyze are not measured at the
interval level and those that are, even our dependent variable,
the candidate for whom people voted, are typically two-category
dummy variables.
9

Katherine Rocha, Chris Sabetta and Roger Clark
of Republicans is controlled, the association between
Trump’s margin and index of overall wellbeing was
strong, significant and negative (beta = -.19). (See
Table1.)
Table 1. Regression of Trump Margin by State on
the Percentage of the State Population Reporting
That It Is Republican (REPUBLICAN) and Overall
Wellbeing Index (WELLBEING)
Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
REPUBLICAN		
WELLBEING		

.91***
-.19***

N of States		

50

Adjusted R-square

.92

However, if “ill being,” the opposite of “well being,”
was a significant predictor of Trump’s margin of victory
at the state level, the question arises as to what was the
nature of this “ill being” at the individual level. The
cultural lag and the cultural backlash perspectives on
support for populism provide three testable hypotheses.
Table 2 shows fundamental support, even while it also
reveals some surprises. We begin with our control
variables in the regression analyses presented here.
Comparison between the 2016 and 2012 elections
suggests that, at the zero-order level, REPUBLICAN (r
in 2016 = .61; r in 2012 = .64) was slightly less salient in
the 2016 than in the 2012 election. Race, gender and age
had about the same salience in the 2016 election as they
did in the 2012 election. But the importance of religion
to a voter was actually considerably more salient in the
2016 election (r = .26) than it was in 2012 (r = .11).
People who defined themselves as religious were much
more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton. They were
even more likely to do that than religious voters were to
vote for Romney than Obama.
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hypothesis that income affected the 2016 result, if it
were not for the fact that, by contrast, Romney voters
tended to have considerably more income than Obama
voters (r =.14). As a general rule, Republicans tend to
be higher earners than Democrats. The 2016 election
proved to be the rule’s exception, suggesting that many
income-strapped voters did in fact vote for Trump.
Similarly, voters without a stock portfolio were only a
little more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton in the
2016 election (r for STOCKS = -.07), but, compared to
the non-existent relationship in the 2012 election (r =
.00), this difference suggests that Trump’s candidacy was
relatively effective at drawing voters with little wealth.
The other two hypotheses derived from the cultural
lag perspective are also supported, but, in this case, the
support is somewhat undermined by the comparison
with 2012 results. It is widely believed, for instance,
that less educated voters were more likely to vote for
Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between
EDUCATION and a Trump vote (r = -.12) supports
this belief. But the fact that the correlation between
EDUCATION and a Romney vote was stronger (r =
-.16) suggests that education may not have been quite
as telling in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012
election. It is also a common belief that those who felt
the economy was doing badly were more likely to vote
for Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between
ECONOMY and a Trump vote (r = .48) would appear
to be strong support for this view. But, when one
sees that the correlation between a Romney vote and
ECONOMY in 2012 was even stronger (r = .58), one
is led to entertain the possibility that disappointment
with the economy’s performance does not completely
explain Trump’s success, or at least was not as salient a
factor in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 election.

In contrast, the correlation coefficients reported in
Table 2 show both absolute and relative support for all
of the hypotheses derived from the cultural backlash
perspective. BLACKS, measuring the extent to which
voters disagreed with the statement that “Blacks have
gotten less than they deserve,” was strongly correlated
with voting for Trump (r = .54), even more strongly
Table 2 also offers support for hypotheses derived than it was with votes for Romney when he was running
from the cultural lag perspective. However, this support against a black incumbent whom some Americans
is sometimes only evident when one contrasts the resented (r = .47). Voting for Trump was more highly
2016 results with the 2012 results. Thus, the negligible correlated with disagreement with the feeling that gays
correlation between INCOME and a vote for Trump and lesbians should not be discriminated against (r =
in 2016 (r =.01) would not immediately support the .30) than voting for Romney was (.25), even though, in
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both cases, the correlation is relatively high. Negative
feelings about undocumented immigrants was much
more strongly correlated with a vote for Trump (r=.44)
than it was with a vote for Romney (.28), though in
neither case was the correlation weak. And negative
feelings about media attention to discrimination against
women was much more strongly associated with a vote
for Trump (.49) than it was with a vote for Romney
(.35), although, again, in both cases the correlation is
strikingly high. (See Table 2.)

(See Table 3.)
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DISCUSSION

We find evidence that voting for Trump in the 2016
election may have been substantially motivated by
sentiments resulting from economic and technological
changes that have gotten ahead of American society’s
ability to adapt—i.e., from cultural lag. We argue that
the long-term disruption of the job market for the
working class, especially the white working class, has left
It is, of course, possible that some of the insights a considerable portion of the American electorate with
available from Table 2 would require modification when a sense of malaise. Moreover, our state-level analysis
we examine the associations of independent variables suggests that this malaise, this feeling of ill being, was a
with voting behavior, controlling for other variables. strong correlate of Trump’s margins.
Table 3 presents the results of regression analyses and, in
fact, it suggests that some of the insights provided by the
Our individual-level analyses suggest support for
correlation analyses do need to be reconsidered. Thus, the notion that Trump’s success had more to do with
for instance, when all other variables are controlled, resentments that may have been fostered by economic
voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic disruption than by lingering economic disadvantages
candidate in both the 2016 and the 2012 elections if themselves. In terms of income and stockholdings, for
religion was important to them (beta for 2016 = -.09, instance, Trump voters were not different from Clinton
for 2012 = -.12).
voters, although their relative economic disadvantage,
compared to Romney voters in 2012, is notable.
Crucially, though, the regression analyses continue Relatively speaking, they were slightly less educated
to provide solid support for the cultural backlash than Romney voters, but not significantly less educated
hypotheses, while they provide more ambiguous support than Clinton voters, when other variables in our analysis
for the cultural lag hypotheses. Thus, the 2016 betas for were controlled. They were much more likely than
BLACKS, IMMIGRANTS, GAYS, and WOMEN (.17, Clinton voters to see the economy as worse off than it
.12, .06 and .16, respectively) are all stronger than their was the previous year, but, compared to Romney voters
counterparts in 2012 (.15, .08, .00, and .08, respectively) in 2012, they were not quite as adamant on this point.
and statistically significant. Trump voters seem to have
been unusually unsympathetic to the condition of
We want to point to limitations of our study,
blacks, undocumented immigrants, gays and lesbians, however, that make suspect its apparent negligible to
and women.
weak support for the view that Trump supporters have
been more disadvantaged by economic upheaval than
On the other hand, support for the cultural lag Clinton supporters. First, and perhaps most important,
hypotheses is less strong in the regression analyses than we have no data about the past workplace experiences of
it appeared to be in the correlation analyses. None of the voters in the 2016. We cannot say, as a result, what kind
betas for INCOME, STOCKS, and EDUCATION (.00, of dislocations voters may have experienced during the
-.01, and -.02, respectively) is statistically significant, Great Recession of 2008/2009, or over the past forty
and only the one for INCOME suggests much more or fifty years—and, hence, how these dislocations may
relative economic deprivation among Trump voters than have been related to their vote in the 2016 Presidential
its counterpart (beta = .05) for the 2012 election. The election. Second, we do not have access to data about
beta for ECONOMY (.20) in the 2016 election strongly whether voters were unemployed or non-participants
suggests that Trump voters felt more disappointment in the labor force—both better indicators of current
over the economy’s performance than Clinton voters economic insecurity than any measures we were able to
did, but it also suggests less relative disappointment employ. Third, our finding of little difference between
than its counterpart (beta = .30) does for Romney Trump and Clinton voters in terms of income, wealth
voters, compared to Obama voters, in the 2012 election. and education is actually fairly striking, given the
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Table 2. Correlates of Trump and Romney Votes
Trump/Clinton
2016

Table 3. Regression of Trump and Romney Votes on
Other Variables

Romney/Obama
		
2012

Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
Trump/Clinton
Romney/Obama
2016
2012

REPUBLICAN

.61***

.64***

REPUBLICAN

.33***		.35***

WHITE		

.33***

.34***

WHITE		

.14***		.16***

GENDER		

-.06**

-.07***

AGE		

.13***

.11***

RELIGION

.26***

.11***

INCOME

.01		

.14***

STOCKS 		

-.07***

.00

EDUCATION

-.12***

-.16***

ECONOMY		

.48***

.58***

BLACKS 		

.54***

IMMIGRANTS
GAYS			
		
WOMEN		

GENDER		

-.02		

-.03

AGE			

.03*		

.02

RELIGION 		

-.09***

INCOME 		

-.12***

.00 			.05**

STOCKS 		

-.01 		

-.04*

EDUCATION 		

-.02 			.01

ECONOMY 		

.20***		.30***

BLACKS		

.17*** 		.15***

.47***

IMMIGRANTS

.12***		.08***

.44***

.28***

GAYS			

.06***		.00

.30***

.25***		

WOMEN		

.16***		.08***

.49***

.35***

N			

2211			

Adjusted R-square

.61			.61

Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 =
1,860. An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates
significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the
.001 level. Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1=Republican; 0 = not
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white; 0 = non-white; GENDER:
1= female ; 0=male; RELIGION: 1= religion important; 0 =
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks; 0 = owns no
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher
values indicate greater agreement with feeling that media
should pay less attention to discrimination against women.
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Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 =
1,860. An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates
significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the
.001 level. Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1= Republican; 0 = not
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white; 0 = non-white; GENDER:
1= female ; 0 = male; RELIGION: 1 = religion important; 0 =
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks; 0 = owns no
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher values
indicate greater agreement with feeling that media should pay
less attention to discrimination against women.
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historic tendency of Republicans to be richer and better
We find more evidence for hypotheses based upon the
educated than Democrats. It may actually mean that cultural backlash perspective. Trump voters expressed
more of the poorer and less-educated voters voted for greater resentments about blacks, immigrants, women
Trump than typically vote for Republican candidates. and gays and lesbians than did Clinton voters and
Nonetheless, to the extent that our indicators do tap these differences were considerably greater than similar
the current economic conditions of voters, we can say ones that distinguished voters in the 2012 presidential
that we were unable to turn up much evidence that election. Unfortunately, the data we analyzed cannot
those conditions did much to distinguish Trump from help us discern whether these resentments would have
Clinton voters.
been detectable before the Trump candidacy or whether
the Trump candidacy was a necessary condition for
What we did find considerable evidence for is such resentments becoming notable and noted.
the view that Trump voters were more likely to
express resentments, conceivably resulting from past
economic challenges, about various minority and/or LITERATURE CITED
marginalized groups than Clinton voters. This has been
true of supporters of previous Republican candidates, Friedman, Thomas. 2016. Thank You for Being Late: An
compared to those of their Democratic opponents, as
Optimist’s Guide in the Age of Accelerations. New York:
our data on the 2012 election affirm. But the differences
Ferrar, Straus and Girous.
between the 2016 and 2012 elections suggest that
Trump voters were unusually likely to have negative Gallup. 2017. State of the States. Retrieved June 2, 2017.
attitudes towards blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians,
(http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/state-states.aspx)
and women, even compared to Republican-candidate
supporters in previous elections. While we cannot say Hochschild, Arlie, 2016. Strangers in Their Own Land. New
for sure that it was only white voters for Trump who
York: The New Press.
had these attitudes, the results do constitute support
for Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) general contention that Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. The Silent Revolution. Princeton:
Trump voters felt resentment towards groups that made
Princeton University Press.
them feel like “strangers in their own land.”
CONCLUSION
In general, using the cultural lag perspective, we find
relatively little support for the contention that Trump
voters were distinguished from Clinton voters in terms
of their economic or educational levels. We find more
support for the conclusion, also derived from the
cultural lag perspective, that they were distinguished
by a relatively bleak view of the economy. However,
we were surprised to see that their bleak view of the
economy did less to distinguish them from Clinton
voters than it did to distinguish Romney from Obama
voters in the 2012 election. Future research, however,
might examine the question of whether Trump voters
have experienced more economic and/or educational
deprivation sometime in their past than Clinton
voters. Such research might provide a truer test of the
cultural lag perspective than we were able to achieve in
our analysis, limited as we were to measures of voters’
current economic and educational situations.
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Abstract
This article focuses on the advent of both semi- and truly-autonomous vehicles, their effect on culture(s) globally,
and the perceptions of different generations of people. Automobile manufacturers in Europe, the U.S., and
China are in a race to change cars, trucks, buses and, by extension, new and different modes of transportation.
Unfortunately, to varying degrees, people and societies are lagging behind in accepting these innovations. In part,
resisting change can be a rational response. For example, semi- and truly-autonomous vehicles can have both
positive and negatives consequences. On the positive side are simplicity and, ultimately, less stress for passengers.
On the darker side are issues in hacking of the computer systems in vehicles and the potential for such vehicles to
be weaponized. Stressing the positive, by re-learning, adapting and accepting autonomous vehicles, societies will
make these vehicles a part of their cultures and their life styles.
Keywords: semi-autonomous vehicles; truly-autonomous vehicles; positive and negative consequences; generational
differences in people's responses to innovations; cultural lag
INTRODUCTION

I first started leading the course (one talks about the
students as participants; instructors do not teach, we
Along with trucks and buses, the automobile has lead the discussions with senior drivers over 55 years
been one of the most useful inventions of the twentieth of age), our course consisted of one small VCR tape of
century. These vehicles have contributed to the economic 20 minutes in length and a small manual. The course
growth of the U.S. (and every other country in the was two days; four hours each day. The instructors were
world) and have affected the lifestyles of people globally, not assisted by computers back then (circa 2004). Each
including our geographic mobility and independence. instructor had to upgrade to new computer skills and
Without them, our lives would be only local or regional. read articles on the newest innovations in vehicles.
This article focuses on the revolution in vehicles that
has been going with increasing frequency in the second
Over the years, the course morphed into one four and
decade of the 21st century. This article also focuses on one half hour program, which includes an hour-long
people’s responses to the dramatic changes in today’s DVD presentation on selected topics. The content of
vehicles and in the projected changes in vehicles in the the course now includes many topics not presented 13
coming years. Finally, it explores the gap between the years previously-- for example, technological advances,
speed at which the transportation revolution is taking such as park and first lane assist; backup cameras for
place and the ability of drivers of various ages to adapt rear vision; blind spot detection; advanced cruise
to these changes.
control; sensors for crash avoidance and automatic
high/low beams and smart headlights (lights that turn
To place this article in context: I have been a volunteer with the direction of the vehicle). Vehicles now offer
driver safety instructor for AARP for the past thirteen mood lighting, heated and vibrating seats, an entire
years. I have seen many changes in the curriculum of dashboard information panel for temperature control,
the course along with the advent of semi-autonomous satellite radio, weather reports to assist drivers in any
vehicles and the start of autonomous vehicles. When weather condition, GPS systems (including maps), and
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sensors for drowsy drivers, which warn the driver that
Waymo, previously called Google Cars, is Google’s
he/she is falling asleep, and lane changing sensors along autonomous vehicle project. By 2016, Waymo already
with warnings for drifting from lanes (AARP Smart had a fleet of semi-autonomous vehicles that have
Driver Course Guidebook 2014: 27-29).
driven over 3 million miles with only two accidents,
neither of which was the fault of the semi-autonomous
Every year cars and trucks change. The latest changes car (Waymo 2016).
include different types of engines and fuel requirements
for operation (e.g., biodiesel, natural gas, electric,
Other prototypes have also been tested. For example,
ethanol, waste oil, and even fuel cell). In 2018, United in cooperation with a Chinese company, Volkswagen
Parcel Service is planning to put Class 6 delivery trucks has developed an experimental air car in China.1 This
with fuel cells on the road. (Jost 2017). According to car drives itself at level 3. At this writing, BMW is testing
Bloomberg Press, electric cars (EV) may make up more a driverless car that parks itself in a parking garage.2
than a third of new-car sales by the end of this decade
(Randall 2017). In a recent Forbes Magazine article,
China has introduced an innovative bus-train hybrid,
Newcomb (2017) describes a Mercedes Benz model which is electric-powered and has no rails (operates on
with onboard controls; when one takes her/his hands sensors picking up white lines on the road surface).
off the steering wheel for five seconds, the car beeps to These vehicles will operate in the Chinese city of
warn the driver and the automobile shuts off after five Zhuzhou by 2018 (Thompson 2017).
more seconds. Teal (2017) also describes innovations
in auto emergency braking systems (AEB) already
Along with the autonomous vehicle revolution comes
available in many European models along with adaptive the prospect of underground shuttles to relieve the
cruise control, parking assist systems, steering assist, congestion of major cities. Innovator and entrepreneur,
and camera-based road sign recognition.
Elon Musk, aims to wipe out traffic by designing 120
mile per hour underground shuttles in Los Angeles
The United States government’s National Highway (Sadler 2017). Uber will also be test flying cars in Dallas
and Transportation Safety Board (NHTSB) has defined and Dubai by 2020 (Huet 2017). The latest news is
Autonomous Driving (AD) as having four levels of Toyota is planning on using a flying car to light the torch
autonomy:
for the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo. The initiative,
code named, SkyDrive, has a long way to go. (AP &
Level One: You drive the vehicle. Various onboard Kageyama 2017). Eventually, the trucking industry
systems back you up.
will also get involved. Autonomous trucks and hybrids,
Level Two: The vehicle can drive some of the time. without drivers, can transport containers of goods
Driver must be ready to take over when necessary.
cross-country on-time and with no overtime. With new
Level Three: The vehicle can drive autonomously much innovations coming out each month, other forms of
of the time. Driver must be ready to take over with advance transportation may surface in the future. Hypo-speed
warning from the vehicle.
planes, trains, and automobiles may also be there, too.
Level Four: The vehicle drives itself all the time.
Passengers can read a newspaper or nap. This level describes
the ultimate autonomous vehicle (Roy 2016).

To date, some problems still linger with MercedesBenz (MB) Drive Pilot E-class program cars. According
to Adams (2016), these cars still have problems with
In 2016, Uber, the ride-hailing service, began using merging and arching of the road (taking corners).
semi-autonomous vehicles within a grid of downtown On the plus-side, the MB S-class vehicles for 2017,
Pittsburgh, PA. That grid is expected to expand in the according to Edelstein (2017), have even more
next couple of years (Cava 2017). Imagine an Uber autonomous capabilities including vehicle-to-vehicle
vehicle, without a driver, coming to your workplace 1
See the video at http://www.flixxy.com/volkswagenor residence to pick you up and delivering you to a
levitating-car.html
particular destination. No cash: just Mastercard @,
Visa @, Paypal @, or ApplePay @.
2
See the video at http: //www.youtube.com/
watch?feature=playerembedded&v=rgM8MOrss40
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communication, remote parking (similar to the BMW
Kristin Kolodge, Executive Director of Driver
parking itself), autonomous braking, following other Interaction and HMI research, concludes “in most
cars in stop-and-go traffic, lane-keep assist, steering cases, as technology concepts get closer to becoming
assist during evasive maneuvers. Moreover, Edelstein reality, consumer curiosity and acceptance increases.
(2017) also reports that the MB S5500 plug hybrid for With autonomous vehicles, we see a pattern which
2018 will have wireless charging capability.
trust drives interest in the technology and right now,
the level of trust is declining.” Kolodge also indicates
DRIVERS’ PERCEPTIONS and CONCERNS
while automated driving is a new and complex concept,
many consumers must experience it firsthand to fully
The question in most drivers’ minds is: Can we “trust” understand it (Dobrian 2017).
these semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles? Their
concerns: Semi-autonomous vehicles are controlled DISCUSSION
by sensors, cameras and computers. So, safety and
performance are only as good as the controlling
When fully-autonomous vehicles come on the road in
programs involved.
the future, questions may arise about the liability of an
accident. First, who will be at fault-- the manufacturer
When I ask participants in my driver safety of the vehicle or the owner of the vehicle? Second,
courses about these vehicles, more than two-thirds what is known about the condition of the passenger?
of the participants say they are leery, do not trust Is she or he legally “under the influence?” Can the
the technology, or are just plain baffled by the idea occupant instruct the vehicle to deliver him/her to a
of a vehicle driving itself. Since they started driving, particular place? Third, can disabled persons take these
these seniors have experienced cars with a manual vehicles without problems? Can children, without adult
transmission (now: dual transmission), no seat belts guidance, operate these vehicles? Fourth, will passengers
(now: lap and seat belts), no air bags, no cruise control, even need a driver’s license anymore? Fifth, because
and even no radios.
these vehicles will have multi-lingual capabilities, can
a foreign traveler with little driving experience operate
To change drivers’ perceptions, Durbin (2017) reports these vehicles?
that Fiat-Chrysler and Waymo will be offering free rides
to the public in these semi-autonomous vehicles in the
On the darker side, just like drones, can these vehicles
Phoenix area. Their objectives are to gain feedback from be equipped with weapons by dangerous individuals?
the public and to gain the public’s confidence in these Also, with more people riding in these vehicles,
vehicles. All of these vehicles will have backup drivers there is a question of whether governmental controls
in case of emergencies.
(i.e., controlling the numbers) should be put on the
vehicles. Another big problem is the issue of hacking
A 2017 J.D. Power Report entitled, US Tech Choice the computer of these vehicles by unlawful individuals.
Study, revealed that all generational groups, with the Regarding the potential for hacking, car manufacturers
exception of Gen Y (those born 1977-1994), are become and developers need to design a series of firewalls and
skeptical of self-driving technology. Specifically, 40% of gateways/passwords to prevent unlawful access to the
Boomers (those born 1946-1964) do not see any benefit vehicle’s computer systems.
to self-driving vehicles. Only 7 % of Baby Boomers say
they would purchase a full self-driving vehicle. However,
Along with changes in driving environments, traffic
younger consumers, such as Gen Z (those born 1995- laws must change. Enforcement also may have to change.
2004), are far more comfortable with autonomous According to National Conference of State Legislatures
technologies than are older generations. Moreover, Gen (NCSL), as of early 2017, 13 states --Alabama, Arkansas,
Z consumers also say they have a higher interest in a California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, New York,
digital key (versus a physical key or a fob) and 50% of Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah,
age cohort indicated that they are definitely/probably Virginia-- and District of Columbia have passed
interested in mobility sharing or co-ownership of a legislation to allow autonomous vehicles to operate on
future vehicle. Unmanned mobility (level 4) is favored those states’ roads (www.ncsl.com).
by 56% of this age grouping.
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Possible positive consequences may come about:
There would be little road rage or any emotional dispute
over some slight that may happen on the road. Drowsy
and drunk people can be easily transported to their
destination without incident. Persons with handicaps
will be able to use these vehicles with some modifications
in seating to travel anywhere. Also, passengers do not
need to spend long hours navigating traffic on long
trips.
CONCLUSION
On a more sociological note, because of the increasing
cost of such vehicles, more people may opt to car-share,
or co-own, or to choose other forms of transportation.
We may have a return to mass transportation--- high
speed trains or inter-city trolley systems. Or take either
Lyft or Uber, both ride-hailing entities somewhere.
Autonomous vehicles may provide a moving office or
just be people movers. Moreover, with the increasing
cost of buying and even leasing these new vehicles,
car-sharing, such as Zipcar, may be more economically
feasible for the general public.
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into four categories. As Vago (1999) points out, some
of the variables in these categories tend to stimulate
change whereas others tend to generate resistance to
change. The first category focuses on social variables. The
stimulants for change in this category include the desire
for prestige, contact with people in other societies who
are accepting of an innovation, and participating in the
decision making. In the second category, psychological
variables, the motivation to change and perceived
needs can operate as stimulants to change. Seniors are,
generally, more reluctant to try something new. Younger
people tend to be less reluctant. That suggest that most
people would eventually accept the stress-less aspect
of self-driving vehicles. In the category of economic
variables, cost and economic advantage are major
factors affecting change. Is the innovation affordable?
Will the innovation be a major improvement over
previously-existing options with which a consumer are
familiar? Like variables in the social and psychological
categories, economic factors can either aid or hinder the
acceptance of autonomous vehicles. The cost of these
vehicles relative to the benefits they offer will figure
into the decision to purchase one in the future. Vago’s
(1999) fourth category, cultural variables, includes the
type of culture and the degree of cultural integration.
For example, a low cultural context and/or low cultural
integration would be the biggest hindrance to accepting
autonomous vehicles. Since autonomous vehicles are
still completely untested, they are not yet part of the
fabric of national or global culture(s). Therefore, the
potential impact of cultural variables is presently
unknown.

All these vehicle innovations will require re-learning,
adjustment, and adaptation. Just as we have learned
to adjust to other technologies in our daily lives, we
need to adapt to changes in the area of transportation
technology. One final question: How easy is it for “old
dogs” to learn new tricks? The author’s answer: That
depends on certain variables and how they operate.
Which variables are most influential in getting older
drivers to accept new technological changes? An
extensive cross-disciplinary literature exists on what
Baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964),
is involved in the adoption of innovations and, more especially, love their cars and trucks as they presently
recently, in resistance to innovations (Ram 1987).
are. Using Rogers (1962) innovation adoption lifecycle
terminology, this age cohort would fall into the
Decades ago, Rogers (1962) identified five important Laggards category: the 16% of the bell-shaped curve
characteristics of an innovation: Relative Advantage, who resist the adoption of an innovation. Interestingly,
Compatibility, Perceived Risk, Opportunity to Try the Generation X, generally those born between 1965 and
innovation before committing to it (Trialability), and 1976, would be considered part of the Late Majority,
Communicability. Relative advantages of self-driving the 34% of the curve who adopt just after the “average”
vehicles, for example, are cost and conveniences for consumer; Generation Y, generally those born between
passengers (no one has to drive). Opportunity to try 1977 and 1994, and would likely fall into the Early
the innovation, too, is an on-going process, from semi- Majority, the 34% who adopt the innovation just before
autonomous to fully unmanned, autonomous vehicles. the average consumer; and Generation Z, generally,
those born between 1995 and 2012, would fall into the
Which variables are important for the implementation small category (2.5%) of Early Adopters, consumers who
and acceptance of these vehicles? Sociologist Stephen would adopt an innovation relatively quickly. A lot of
Vago (1999) organizes potentially influential variables research conducted in the 1960’s and 1970s attempted

The Advent of Autonomous Vehicles: A Transportation Revolution
15
to identify the characteristics of the individuals that age, autonomous vehicles will be a way of life. Until
fell into these categories. The evidence reporting the manufacturers eliminate the glitches and problems in
characteristics of the individuals falling into each these vehicles (as of June 2017), we will have to wait
category was inconsistent (Harper and Leicht 2011:244- until these manufacturers make the decision to release
245).
them for public and private use. In that world of the near
future, once autonomous vehicles are standard on the
In sum, to maintain their mobility, older drivers road, Driver Safety courses will no longer be necessary.
must adapt to changing transportation conditions
and do so soon. Automobiles, trucks and other hybrid LITERATURE CITED
vehicles, will become more complex, more efficient, and
more innovative than any vehicle previously built. The Adams, Eric. (http://www.wired.com/2016/06/mercedes-newrate of innovation in these vehicles has also increased
e-class-kinda-drives-kinda-confusing/)
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sources also matter. For safety reasons, governments may
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accommodate newer vehicles. One important concern
is that newer, autonomous vehicles cannot communicate
with older, semi-autonomous vehicles. Various popular
media, especially social media and movies, will also
influence people’s views on autonomous vehicles. It
is likely that more consumers will look at these new
vehicles as convenient modes of transportation and not
as troublesome, expensive vehicles which will replace
their “beloved” vintage “toys.” Will the new vehicles
have the soul and personality attributed to much-loved,
older vehicles?
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Abstract
Using a framework offered by the concept of cultural lag, the authors examine two perspectives on the drug
overdose epidemic afflicting America. A “deaths of despair” perspective emphasizes cumulative disadvantages that
have beset certain segments of the U.S. population, rendering them “desperate for relief.” In contrast, a “heroin
markets” perspective suggests that white-powder heroin from Colombia has made heroin an attractive substitute
for prescription drugs, like Oxycontin, and that the recent phenomenal growth in the number of overdose deaths
has more to do with its market than anything else. The authors use secondary data to test three hypotheses
derived from these perspectives. Although the available data are limited, they find support for both perspectives,
particularly the “heroin market,” one. They discuss implications.
Keywords: cultural lag, deaths of despair, heroin markets, deaths of addiction
INTRODUCTION
The drug overdose epidemic in the United States has
been, and continues to be, a scourge upon the land. In
2016, for which data were beginning to come in at this
writing, approximately 62,000 Americans died from
overdoses, about a 19 percent increase over 2015 (Katz
2017). This number outstrips that of American lives
lost to automobile accidents, gun shots and suicides
(Economist 2017a). The drug overdose epidemic has
become increasingly visible. One Ohio coroner’s office
in 2016, for example, stored dead opioid victims in
refrigerated trucks outside its office because the bodies
were pouring in faster than they could be processed
(Economist 2017b). Quinones (2017) reports that “drug
overdosing” is currently the number one killer of people
under 50 in the United States.

women (Case and Deaton 2015). In recent years
the life expectancy for this social category has been
decreasing, not increasing, as it continues to be for
all others in the U. S. and the Western world. Monnat
(2016) found a strong correlation between counties that
voted for Donald Trump and ones that had high drug,
alcohol and suicide mortality rates and concluded that
this signaled that Trump voters often suffered from
hopelessness and despair. Further contributing to the
notion that drug overdose deaths are rooted in despair
is convincing research suggesting that such deaths may
often be misclassified suicides (e.g., Rockett et al. 2014).
Suicides, most assume, are a sign of hopelessness and, if
overdose deaths are really hidden suicides, the thinking
goes, such deaths are also a sign of hopelessness.

Our investigation, largely driven by our belief that
drug overdose deaths can be reasonably investigated as a
Drug overdose deaths, along with alcohol-related manifestation of a particular kind of cultural lag, began
deaths and suicides, are increasingly known as “deaths with the expectation that we would uncover evidence
of despair,” and are attributed to a reversal in what that drug overdose deaths are in fact deaths of despair.
some imagined to be irreversible; that is, the mortality We found such evidence, but also found evidence,
and morbidity rates for middle-aged white men and perhaps even stronger, for another perspective: that
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these deaths have become more about markets for
heroin and, perhaps, fentanyl-- a narcotic, analgesic, Zee 2009; Quinones 2015) say, were often unethical
and sedative. We will first consider the case that the and sometimes illegal. To suggest, as we do, that the
development of a product (in this case Oxycontin) was
overdose epidemic is an instance of cultural lag.
responsible for the increased supply of legal opioids
The Overdose Epidemic as an Instance of Cultural is not to ignore the importance of changing attitudes
towards opioids in the medical community, attitudes that
Lag
as early as the 1980s had begun to doubt the thinking
William Ogburn’s (1922) concept of cultural lag that opioids were highly addictive and generally to be
refers to the social problems that can occur as the avoided (e.g., Quinones 2015: 15ff). The widespread
nonmaterial culture of a society (e.g., beliefs, values, sale and use of drugs like Oxycontin would have been
perspectives) adapts to economic or technological impossible if a context of relatively relaxed attitudes
changes. The implicit period of delayed adjustment can towards the addictive potential of opioids had not
emerged in the medical community.
generate serious hardships for a population.
In the case of the drug overdose epidemic, there
have been at least two changes in the material culture
(e.g., everything tangible that society produces, such as
tools, inventions, artifacts ) that have been viewed as
appropriate suspects. One change, the massive upheaval
in U.S. manufacturing and job loss, brought about by
automation and relocation over the past five decades,
has been associated with the demand for opiates. Parts
of the U.S. have suffered selective economic declines
that have led to downward mobility for many people.
This increased economic vulnerability, augmented
by the Great Recession of the last decade, has raised
fears and anxieties that have, in turn, led many to drown
and/or drug their sorrows, and sometimes to take their
lives. Monnat (2016) demonstrates that the most
economically distressed counties in the U.S. are also
the ones that have the highest rates of drug, alcohol and
suicide mortality.
In the middle 1990s, a second kind of material
change took place: the development of prescription
drugs that promised the delivery of “safe,” presumably
non-addictive, opioid products for pain relief. This
change increased dramatically the supply of opioids in
the American marketplace. Until then, doctors largely
prescribed opioids only for patients suffering from
acute pain or terminal conditions.
Perhaps the major “breakthrough” was Purdue
Pharma’s discovery and marketing, in 1996, of
Oxycontin. Oxycontin, a time-released formula
for large, and varying, dosages of oxycodone, was
designed for people suffering from chronic pain. This
drug gained FDA approval for this purpose and was
energetically marketed by Purdue, which employed

Two Perspectives on the Drug Death Epidemic
We have found two major perspectives accounting
for the drug death epidemic: a “deaths of despair”
perspective and a “heroin market” perspective. Both
perspectives are of recent origin. The first perspective,
associated with Anne Case and Angus Deaton1 (e.g.,
Case and Deaton 2017; Case and Deaton 2015a; Case
and Deaton 2015b) argues that a loss of a sense of
wellbeing within a significant swath of the American
population is primarily responsible for its having
turned to highly addictive drugs, alcohol and suicide. In
its most recent and comprehensive formulation (Case
and Deaton 2017), the “deaths of despair” lens suggests
that a cumulative disadvantage has occurred, most
remarkably for whites with lower education. Unlike
hypotheses that have located the mortality problem in
stagnant and declining incomes (e.g., Stiglitz 2015),
hypotheses that Case and Deaton claim cannot account
for why less-educated whites should have poorer
mortality outcomes than, for example, less-educated
members of minority groups, the “deaths of despair”
perspective traces health and mortality declines to the
progressively worsening labor market opportunities
of less-educated whites and various correlates of this
worsening.
The steady decline in job opportunities for whites
with lower education levels has not only had enormous
effects on their marriage and divorce prospects (Cherlin
2009; Kenschaft, Clark and Ciambrone 2016), but also
on the life chances of their children (Murray 2012;
Putnam 2015). Members of this social category have
Case and Deaton are affiliated with Princeton University’s Center
for Health and Wellbeing.
1
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become much less likely to marry, much more likely to sure. In Dreamland, Quinones’ (2015) marvelous study
divorce when they do marry, much more likely to have of the opiate epidemic, he found that addiction spread
children out of wedlock, much more likely to expose particularly quickly within one church community.
their children to unstable family lives, and much less In general, though, the literature led us to our
likely to enable those children to attain good educations second hypothesis we propose related to the “death of
than did less educated whites in the past. Moreover, despair.”
Case and Deaton (2017:33) point out that “half of the
men who are out of the labor force are taking pain
Hypothesis 2: States with high percentages of their
medication, and two thirds of those take prescription populations saying they are not religious will have
painkiller, such as opioids.” Case and Deaton concluded higher drug overdose death rates than other states.
that reversing the trend towards deaths of despair
cannot be done with purely economic solutions, at least
If the “death of despair” perspective on drug
not through short-term economic solutions. What is overdose deaths has a short pedigree, the “heroin
necessary is a program that addresses the family issues, market” perspective, as far as we can tell, has an
the lack of spiritual fulfillment, “perceived meaning even shorter one. We first saw it articulated in a short
and satisfaction” (Case and Deaton 2017: 34) that lead Economist article on May 11th, 2017 (Economist 2017c).
to despair. As Case and Deaton note, this prescription This perspective argues that the long-term trend in drug
is not a particularly encouraging one.
deaths may not only have much to do with workingclass despair, but also that its recent, life-defying rise
In this paper we focus exclusively on drug overdose has even more to do with access to heroin markets.
deaths rather than combining them with alcohol-related
deaths and suicides. We also use state-level data. One
Until about 2010, the increase in opioid deaths was
of the hypotheses we examine emerges directly from highly related to prescription drugs, like Oxycontin. In
this “deaths of despair” perspective, namely:
the past few years, heroin and potent synthetic drugs,
like fentanyl, have become more significant, even
Hypothesis 1: States with populations reporting high though most users of the latter two drugs were formerly
levels of overall wellbeing will have lower drug overdose abusers of the former.
death rates than states with populations reporting low levels
of overall wellbeing.

We examined variables that, while not being proofs
against despair, had been suggested to be inhibitors
of despair. Religiosity is one factor that kept coming
up in our examination of the literature on suicide and
alcoholism, drug use, and even despair itself. Thus,
for example, in a large number of articles published
between 1980 and 2008, Gearing and Lizardi (2009)
found epidemiological support for the protective effects
of religious commitment, a protection that existed across
Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Hindu communities.
Similarly, in another review article, Haber et al. (2011)
found a consistent inverse relationship between
alcoholism and religion or spirituality. Kendler Gardner,
and Prescott (1997) and Binswanger et al. (2012)
have found evidence, in disparate populations, that
religiosity can be a protective factor against drug use
and overdosing. Other studies (e.g., McClain et al.
2003) have even found evidence that spiritual wellbeing
can be a protection against despair in terminally ill
cancer patients. The literature is not unequivocal, to be

Drug abusers often make the switch from prescription
drugs to heroin and synthetic drugs because the latter are
cheaper and more potent. There are actually two major
kinds of heroin on the U. S. market currently and only
one of these, a white-powder heroin from Colombia,
looks and acts sufficiently like crushed pain pills that
it has made the switch an easy one for prescriptiondrug addicts. Once this switch is made, fentanyl, or
some other synthetic drug, often comes into the mix.
According to the Economist (2017c), a Mexican brownpowder or black-tar heroin, which figures much more
prominently in Quinones’s (2015) story and is more
characteristically found west of the Mississippi, has
“probably deterred many painkiller addicts from trying
the drug (i.e., heroin), and has kept synthetic opioids at
bay” according to the Economist (2017c).
While neither the Economist nor its primary data
source, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), provide
us with a way of determining precisely which states are
most involved in the white-powder heroin market, the
CDC has recently begun to provide data on how many
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Major
Variables
and
Statistical
Analysis
of the drug overdose deaths in a state can be attributed
to heroin. These data are only available, however, for the
Our dependent variable is the overall drug overdose
28 states for which the CDC finds the heroin overdose
death rate per 100,000 (age-adjusted) in 2013 and 2015
death data “good” quality or better.
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017a). The three major
As a first approximation of the market for independent variables in our analysis are measures of
white-powder heroin in a state, we use statewide a state’s population’s overall wellbeing, its religiosity
heroin overdose death rates to test the heroin market and its heroin markets. For the first two independent
variables we use data provided by Gallup’s (2017)
perspective:
“State of the States” for 2016. These data summarize
Hypothesis 3: States with higher heroin overdose death daily polls taken throughout the year to provide overall
rates will have higher overall drug overdose rates than states measures on many state (and city and individual)
with lower heroin overdose death rates.
characteristics. Our measure of states’ overall wellbeing
is Gallup’s Overall Well-Being Index in 2016, a measure
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH and MAJOR that is a composite indicator of people’s sense of
purpose, their social and financial wellbeing, their
VARIABLES
sense of community and physical health.3
Data Sources and Limitations
Our measure of religiosity is the percentage of a
The tests of our hypotheses are based on data available state’s residents who say religion is not important in
to researchers for secondary analysis. Specifically, we their lives and that they seldom or never attend religious
used data from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2017a) services. A high score on this measure is interpreted,
and from Gallup’s (2017) “State of the States.” Data for for this study, as a low score on religiosity. We used
this project were not always easy to locate. We were Gallup (2017) for our 2016 measure and found an
limited by budget to materials available online, but we earlier Gallup measure of the same variable in 2011
have located data sources that researchers with deeper from Hicken (2012).
pockets or more prestigious institutional affiliations
With no more than 50, and sometimes as few as
may also want to explore.
28, states as units of analysis, there are relatively few
Because of budget and data limitations, we had to degrees of freedom to conduct simple linear multiple
make some methodological compromises. For example, regression analyses, especially given the relatively
when we tried to measure heroin markets, we ran into large number of independent variables we are initially
our most severe data barriers. Not surprisingly, there are interested in. Therefore, we employ forward stepwise
no good state-level data on the kinds of heroin available regression analyses via the Statistical Package of
in illegal heroin markets. Therefore, we decided that a the Social Sciences (SPSS). We use the variables we
decent, but imperfect, substitute measure is the heroin speculated might be related to the drug overdose death
overdose death rate by state.2 But certain bits of critical rate and select variables that create an economical
information are, to the best of our knowledge, simply model. Specifically, we instructed SPSS to add the most
significant variable at each step of its processing until
untapped as of now.
We used this measure, aware of the limitation that it is a
constituent of our dependent variable, the overall overdose death
rate by state, and therefore likely to be more highly correlated with
it than other possible measures, the likeliest, perhaps, being the
drug arrest rate by state. Unfortunately, alternate measures like
crime rates, including the drug arrest rate, vary with many things
other than heroin usage (including the usage of other drugs and the
highly variable inclinations of state law enforcement authorities
to criminalize drug usage). Therefore, we view crime rates as an
even more imperfect measure of heroin markets than the heroin
overdose death rate. Moreover, we have determined that not all
constituents of the overall drug overdose death rate are strongly
correlated. Thus, for instance, the methadone overdose death rate
2

is correlated with the heroin overdose death rate at a weak .11
level. In the absence of a better measure of the extent to which
heroin markets thrive in states, then, and with genuine concern
about the appropriateness of our measure, we proceeded.
We spoke with a Gallup representative about obtaining measures
of overall wellbeing for earlier years, but found the costs to do so
were beyond our (and our College’s) means. The closest we were
able to come to an earlier measure was not the actual index in an
earlier year but a ranking of states by overall wellbeing in 2012
(Gallup-Heathways 2012). We have used these data in our panel
regression analysis reported later in this paper.
3
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all variables not in the selected model have p values higher (Wikipedia 2017, based on U.S. Census data).
that are greater than .05.
We also expected states with older populations, which
are more likely to receive legal opioid prescriptions
The forward stepwise regression analysis enables a for pain, to have higher drug overdose death rates than
cross-sectional examination of the variables that have others and entered a measure of median age in 2014
the greatest controlled association with our dependent (Murphy 2015). Along these same lines, we felt the
variable, drug overdose death rates. But both the drug overdose death rates might directly vary with the
“despair” and the “markets” perspective focus on change prescription rates of legal opioid painkillers and so
in drug overdose death rates. Consequently, another entered a measure of this in 2012, the date for which
statistical tool we use here is panel regression analysis. we could find such an indicator (Paulozzi et al. 2014).
Panel regression analysis permits the evaluation of the The literature led us to expect that drug overdose deaths
impact of several independent variables on change in might be concentrated in states with predominantly
a dependent variable by regressing the latter on itself white populations and, in any case, wanted to enter a
(in 2015) and the independent variables at an earlier variable measuring race, so use data on the percentage
time (in 2013). This statistical tool usually yields a of a state’s population that was white in 2015 (Kaiser
conservative test because the lagged dependent variable Family Foundation 2017b). We thought it possible
is normally extremely highly correlated with itself at that two kinds of populations might be more likely to
the earlier time (cf. Hannan 1979). This is especially have strong norms against drug use: people identifying
likely to be the case with short time lags, such as the as Republicans and those who are very religious, and
one used in this analysis (two years).
so we entered measures of each, again using Gallup
data (Gallup 2017). We also speculated that marijuana
Based on the Economist’s (2107c) analysis, we might be a gateway drug to drug overdose deaths and
assumed that states with higher heroin death rates so entered a measure of statewide marijuana use, based
are ones in which a white-powder heroin market is the National Survey on Drug Use and Health in 2014
dominant, since it is in these states that prescription (Hughes et al. 2016).
drug addicts will have most likely switched over to
heroin. Since the CDC (2017) has determined that Results
heroin deaths are sufficiently accurate in 28 states,
those are the states for which published data on heroin
We first performed a cross-sectional analysis
death rates were available in 2014 and 2015. We use involving the drug overdose death rate as the dependent
these data in both a cross-sectional stepwise regression variable and 11 independent or predictor variables.4
analysis and our panel regression analysis.
These 11 predictors were: the unemployment rate in
2015, the percentage of the population claiming to be
We entered nine other variables into our cross- nonreligious in 2016, the proportion of the population
sectional analyses, anticipating that some of these with a high school certificate or more of formal
might supersede our main independent variables education, the prescription rate of legal opioids in
as predictors of drug overdose deaths rates. The 2012, the percentage of the population that was white
conventional view that economic deprivation leads in 2015, the poverty rate in 2015, the median age of the
to drug misuse (e.g., Stiglitz 2015) led us to several population in 2015, the percentage of the population
possibilities. We expected, for example that states with a Republican party affiliation in 2016, the
with higher unemployment rates would have higher percentage of the population claiming to be religious in
drug overdose death rates than others and so entered 2016, the Gallup index measuring the level of well being
a measure of unemployment rates in 2015 (Bureau of experienced by the population in 2016, and marijuana
Labor Statistics 2017). We expected that states with use in 2014.
higher poverty rates would experience higher overdose
death rates than others and so entered poverty rates for
Table 1 shows that the forward stepwise regression
2015 (Bishaw and Glassman 2016). We thought that found that two of these variables constituted an
better educated populations would have lower overdose 4
We did not include heroin overdose death rates, which are only
death rates than others and entered the percentage of available for 28 states and which the CDC suggests may not be
the state population with a high school diploma or reliable enough for cross-state comparisons.
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Table 2. Final Model Produced by Forward
economical model: the index of overall wellbeing in
Stepwise Regression of Drug Overdose Death
2016, with a beta of -.75 in the final model, and the
Rate by State on Thirteen Independent Variables,
percent of the population claiming to be nonreligious in
including Heroin-Induced Death Rates
2016, with a beta of .51 in the final model. This finding
would appear to support the perspective that drug
					
Betas
overdose deaths are substantially a result of despair.
States with higher well-being indices have lower
Heroin-Induced Death Rates		.67***
drug overdose death rates than others and states with
higher percentages of their populations claiming to
Opioid Prescription Rates, 2012
	.33**
be nonreligious (or lacking a major protection against
N					
28
despair) have higher death rates than others. (See Table
1.)
Adjusted R-square			
	.52
			
Table 1. Final Model Produced by Forward
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the .001 level.
Stepwise Regression of the Drug Overdose Death
Rate by State on Eleven Independent Variables
Still, Table 2 must be interpreted with caution. The
without a Measure of Heroin-Related Death Rates
data in Table 2 suggest that, when a measure of heroin
deaths is introduced, only it (beta =.67) and the legal
					
Betas
opioid prescription rate (beta = .33) appear in a model.
Moreover, this model explains about 10 percent more
Overall Well-Being Index, 2016
-.75***
variation (adjusted R-square = .52) in drug overdose
Percentage of Population Claiming to
death rates for the 28 states involved than did the model
Be Nonreligious, 2016		
	.51***
in Table 1 (adjusted R-square =. 42) for 50 states. We
thus, cautiously, infer that, in cross-sectional models at
N 						 50
least, there appears to be greater support for the “market”
Adjusted R-square				.42
than the “despair” perspective on drug overdose deaths.
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the .001 level.

However, the problem with this analysis, as
proponents of the “market” perspective on drug
overdose deaths suggest, is that it does not take into
account the effect of the market for heroin in states.
We have tried to take an accounting of its effect by
measuring the market in terms of the heroin death rate
in states, despite the reservations we have for using this
measure. Among these reservations are that “good”
to “excellent” data about heroin deaths rates are only
available for 28 states and, even for these, the Centers
for Disease Control advise that they not be used for
comparisons among states (CDC, 2017). But, we
reasoned, if the heroin death rates are so incomparable,
they would provide a relatively conservative test of
the “market” perspective, even if heroin death rates
are not the ideal measure of the degree to which states
are involved in heroin markets. Their incomparability
might lead us to expect a lower correlation with overall
drug overdose death rates than we would obtain with
more comparable data. (See Table 2.)

Unfortunately, cross-sectional analyses such the
ones presented in Tables 1 and 2 cannot sort out timesequencing and one is left with the questions: which
comes first, the despair, the market for heroin, or the
drug deaths? Also, would the relatively strong support
for the heroin “market” perspective persist if we focused
on changes in the drug overdose death rate rather than
simply levels of that rate? Both questions led us to
employ panel regression, a technique that requires early
and late measures of the dependent variable as well as
measures of the independent variables of interest at
approximately the same time as the early measure of the
dependent variable.
The “lag” in our panel regression analyses is limited
by the data we’ve been able to find online. But, in general,
those analyses again tend to support the “market”
perspective. Thus, when we examined what may have
affected the change in the drug overdose death rate in the
period between 2013 and 2015 (the period for which we
can find online reasonably-appropriate measures of our
key independent variables), we find stronger controlled
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relations between early measures of the heroin death available for 28 states, stepwise regression picked our two
rate and change in drug overdose death rates than we “despair” indicators, overall wellbeing and the absence
do early measures of either of our of statewide despair of religiosity, out of a lineup involving 11 variables.
measures. Table 3 boils down these findings and shows, But when we introduced heroin death rates into an
as one would expect, that the strongest predictor in analysis involving only 28 states, it and our indicator of
our model of 2015 drug overdose deaths rate in the 28 the legal opioid prescription rate (in 2012) pushed the
states involved was drug overdose death rates in 2013 despair indicators out of the picture. Moreover, in our
(beta = .50). A close second was heroin overdose death panel analysis involving the four dependent variables of
rates in 2014 (beta = .49), followed by the legal opioid interest—the two despair variables, the heroin market
prescription rates in 2012 (beta = .36). Neither of our variable and the opioid prescription rate variables—
measures of despair or a potential for despair—e.g., only the latter two had significant associations with
the ranking of states by levels of overall well being in drug overdose death rates in 2015, when drug overdose
2012 (beta = -.18) and the percentage of the population deaths rates in 2013 were controlled. Neither of our
claiming to be nonreligious in 2011 (beta = .13), was perspectives, by the way, had predicted that the legal
statistically significantly related to drug overdose deaths opioid prescription rate would still have the significant
in 2015 when the other variables were controlled, even impact it appears to have on drug overdose deaths
though both variables were related in the predicted in America. That it does is certainly worthy of policy
direction to the dependent variable. (See Table 3.)
consideration (see below).
Table 3. Panel Regression Analysis of Drug
Overdose Death Rate in 2015 on Itself in 2013 and
the Heroin Overdose Death Rate in 2014, Opioid
Prescription Rate in 2012, the Ranking of States
by Levels of Overall Well Being in 2012, and the
Percentage of Those Claiming to be Nonreligious
2011

We have hinted at the caution with which we report
these results. Much of the caution has to do with data
limitations, although some of it has to do with more
theoretical concerns. We are pleased enough with our
despair measures for the cross-sectional analyses, but
neither is easily or cheaply available for the proper
year (2013) of the panel analysis, and the wellbeing
indicator, a ranking of indexes rather than the indexes
					
Betas
themselves for that analysis, is suboptimal. Our measure
of heroin markets is less than ideal for several reasons.
Drug Overdose Death Rate 2013		.50***
Theoretically, we would much prefer some measure of
the degree to which white-powder heroin dominates a
Heroin Overdose Death Rate 2014		.49***
state market for heroin. One can imagine polling being
Legal Opioid Prescription Rate 2012 	.36*
able to tap such a concept, in much the same way The
Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality
Ranking by Overall Well Being 2012
-.18
now polls for marijuana usage. But we’re not there yet.
Percent Nonreligious 2011			.13
Our indicator, the heroin overdose death rate, entails
many difficulties, not the least of which is its likely
N						 28
unreliability for years to come. But even if it were
Adjusted R-square				.81
perfectly reliable, it is obviously a sub-dimension of the
overall drug overdose death rate and therefore more
Notes: * indicates significance at the .05 level; ***, at the .001
likely to be correlated with that rate than a measure with
level.
more obvious face validity. Perhaps the most obvious
problem, however, is the fact that the heroin death
DISCUSSION
rate is available for only 28, just over half of the states.
We find support for both the “deaths of despair” One has to wonder what kinds of biases are involved in
and the “heroin market” perspectives, although the such a partial representation, but they surely include,
support for the latter appears to be stronger than that to some degree, a variable concern for the growing
for the former. In a cross-sectional analysis involving heroin epidemic within the larger drug epidemic. At
all 50 states, without a measure of heroin markets only a more theoretical level, our results may be criticized
for entanglement with the ecological fallacy. Thus, for

Marissa Botelho, Jennifer Lemos, Jessica Souza and Roger Clark
24
instance, just because states with high overall wellbeing in many of the states with the greatest drug overdose
indexes have relatively low drug overdose death rates death rates (Alonso-Zaldivar 2017). At this writing,
does not mean that individuals with a sense of wellbeing these funds, utilized by low-income adults, are likely to
are protected from overdosing.
be cut substantially under Republican healthcare plans.
Still, our results are suggestive, both theoretically
and in terms of public policy. At the theoretical level,
they suggest that the transition from addiction to legal
prescription painkillers to addiction to heroin and
synthetic drugs like fentanyl may now be the main
driver of rapidly increasing drug overdose deaths in
the United States. As a consequence, those concerned
about the drug overdose epidemic may need to
distinguish it, conceptually, from the somewhat clearer
instance of deaths of despair, such as suicide. It may be
more useful to think of drug overdose deaths as deaths
of addiction, addictions that may originally have had
some foundation in despair, but that may also have
had some foundation in chronic pain management or
simple experimentation with opioids for pleasure.

What to do about the markets for white-powder
heroin and synthetic opioids is harder to prescribe,
but so far nothing seems to have worked. Noting the
markets for white-powder and black-tar heroin are
largely separated by the Mississippi River, the Economist
(2017c) recommends that “This is a rare case where one
should pray that America stays divided.” But prayer has
its limits. And efforts have been made to shut down
dark net sources of synthetic drugs, even as these
sources continue to pop up, like targets in a deadly
game of whack-a-mole (Popper 2017).

Dealing effectively with the overdose drug epidemic
will undoubtedly require efforts on many fronts. But
choosing the right fronts will increasingly depend on
figuring out what they are. Generating relevant data and
Case and Deaton (2017) point out that dealing with making those data more readily available to researchers,
overdose deaths as deaths of despair actually points to however, are certainly going to be two of them.
policies that are anything but simple to enact. It would
not only mean attempting to deal creatively with the LITERATURE CITED
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By
Josephine A. Ruggiero

William F. Ogburn (1886-1959) introduced the
concept of cultural lag in his book, Social Change with
Respect to Culture and Original Nature, published in
1922. A staunch advocate of using objective data as the
basis for research conclusions, Ogburn played many
important roles during his life.

students in Introductory Sociology learn about the
meaning and complexities of culture. For example, they
learn that culture, described in simple terms as the way
of life of a society, consists of both material (visible)
and non-material (invisible) aspects. They learn that the
visible items that people produce such as books, tools,
inventions, art forms, movies, television programs, and
Howard Odum (1951: 147-152), a contemporary of video games are influenced by and, in turn, influence
Obgurn’s, composed a detailed biography of Ogburn’s invisible aspects like ideas, theories, values, beliefs, and
work and accomplishments. Ogburn earned his M. knowledge.
A. and Ph.D. degrees in sociology from Columbia
University (in 1909 and 1912 respectively). After college,
Therefore, culture may be aptly compared to an
he taught high-school age students and later, students iceberg or a large tree with deep roots. Both images
at the college level. During his career, Ogburn was also convey that some aspects/components of culture such
an extraordinarily prolific author of books, articles, as behavior are visible and other aspects including
reviews, brochures, pamphlets, and book chapters in beliefs, values, and assumptions are invisible or hidden.
sociology as well as across disciplinary boundaries.
An iceberg is a lot larger that the part we see above the
surface. Similarly, when we look at a tree, we focus on
Among his non-academic roles, Ogburn served as a its branches and leaves, or lack thereof, not on its roots.
president of the American Statistical Association and Typically, a tree’s deepest roots tend to be hidden from
as editor of its journal. He was the first sociologist to view.
be president of the Social Science Research Council
(SSRC) and to chair the SSRC’s Problems and Policy
A deeper examination of the concept of culture
Committee. In 1918-19, during World War I, Ogburn reveals that it has a number of other characteristics:
served as examiner and head of the Cost of Living Culture is shared and passed on through the process of
Department for the National War Labor Board and as socialization. In a complex, heterogeneous society like
a special agent for the United States Bureau of Labor the U. S., the dominant culture is shared and passed on
Statistics. He was an extraordinarily prolific author by at least the majority of a society’s members through
of books, articles, reviews, brochures, pamphlets, and instruction and imitation. In heterogeneous societies
book chapters in sociology as well as across disciplinary sub-cultures and counter-cultures that shape the
boundaries. An important indicator of Ogburn’s behavior, attitudes, values, and beliefs of some smaller
recognition and esteem among American sociologists segments of the population are also typically present.
was his being chosen, in 1929, as the 19th President of
The elements that comprise a culture are
the American Sociological Society (now known as The
interdependent, patterned, and structured-- that is,
American Sociological Association).
they fit together in a meaningful way. Therefore, when
About Culture, Change, and Cultural Lag
one area of a culture changes, change usually occurs
in another/others, although not necessarily at the
As Ogburn recognized, culture is a central concept same time. This time gap captures the idea of cultural
not only to the field of anthropology but also in lag; that is, in the process of change, material aspects
sociology. Within the first several weeks of the course,
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often change first and in an out-of-sync way with nonmaterial aspects. Semi- and fully-autonomous vehicles
offer a good example. Some of these vehicles are
already, or will be, available starting in 2019. However,
the attitudes--especially of older drivers/passengers as
compared to younger ones, may not be in sync with
this technological change when these vehicles become
available in large numbers. Equally important is that
current federal and state motor vehicle laws will become
obsolete in regulating these vehicles. Thus, creating new
laws will be necessary.
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Ogburn's keen observations of American society
of his time led him to introduce the classic concept of
cultural lag into the vocabulary of sociology and into
the study of social and cultural change. He proposed
that most social changes in a modern society arise
from alterations in material culture. He used the term
cultural lag to point out that the non-material aspects
of culture like values, attitudes, beliefs, theories, and
philosophies (the things we cannot see) tend to resist
change and/or to change at a much slower pace than
does material culture. Cultural lag results when people,
groups, organizations and social structures experience
Culture provides a design for living which includes problems in mastering the challenges created by this lag
human solutions to the basic physical problems and (gap, or "period of maladjustment") that occurs between
abstract concerns that human beings across the globe material and non-material culture.
encounter. Humans provide for the continuity of
their society by developing the same range of social Commentary and a Challenge
institutions (e.g., some form(s) of family, an educational
At the time of Ogburn's death in 1959, the U. S. was
system, a political system, an economy, religion(s), and
a health care delivery system. The forms which these a very different country than it is today. During the
social institutions take, however, may vary considerably nearly six decades that have passed since then, this
country has experienced significant social and cultural
from one society to another as well as over time.
changes. In looking at the U. S. then and now, we see
As stated earlier, an important characteristic of that the country has undergone an economic and social
culture is that it changes. Specialists in the field of social transformation from being a primarily agricultural
change have developed a framework for analyzing to an industrial to a post-industrial society. In 1956,
the complexities of change. After identifying the for the first time, white-collar workers outnumbered
phenomenon of interest (the what), they examine four blue-collar workers, heralding the U. S.’s transition to
other aspects of change: 1) level (where in the social a service economy where information has become a
system the change is taking place-- macro vs. micro highly-valued commodity. The country has also grown
level); 2) duration (length of time a particular change in geographical boundaries through the addition of
lasts after it has been accepted (e.g., short- vs. long- Alaska and Hawaii as the 49th and 50th states, in
term); 3) magnitude (how small or large the change the size of the population as well as in its racial and
is-- incremental/a modest alteration vs. comprehensive/ ethnic composition. Changes in the ethnic and racial
sweeping/structural alterations); and 4) rate (speed composition of a society are social changes which
and pattern of the change). The nature and scope of the impact on cultural changes in values, customs, beliefs,
alteration/change depends on the type society in which musical preferences, and technological developments,
the culture exists (e.g., more complex, heterogeneous for example. Over time, social class differences in the
vs. simpler, more homogeneous society).
U. S. have gotten more extreme especially in regard to
the accumulation of wealth. The Wars on Poverty and
Although cultural change is not the same as social against Drugs have both failed. Like it or not, newer
change, the two bear a reciprocal-- that is, a mutual immigrants have become important contributors to
cause and effect, relationship to each other. Cultural the growth in population size and its diversity. The
changes can lead to social changes and vice versa. U. S. population has been described as changing its
For example, the invention and availability of the complexion (e.g., becoming more brown). Although
automobile, a cultural product, affected social changes there are still differences based on race, gender, and
including residential patterns in cities, the settlement of social class, on average, people in the U. S. are becoming
the suburbs, recreational patterns of families, and the older and living longer.
dating practices of young people.
One wonders if Ogburn could have imagined the fast
pace of change that would take place in the U. S. in the
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The
success
and
longevity
of
any
journal
depends
decades after his death and some of the transformations
that would be brought about by technological changes largely on the reach of its social network as well as
alone. Although coined 96 years ago, cultural lag on the number and quality of submissions it receives
remains a useful concept in understanding social and and accepts for publication. My challenge to readers
cultural changes and periods of maladjustments in post- is to be part of SBG’s future success by sending in a
modern societies including the United States. However, submission to SBG4 and to spread the word to others
cultural lag and its consequences appear to be neglected about authoring submissions to SBG.
areas of sociological study and publication.
When the Editorial Board of Sociology between the
Gaps chose the theme of cultural lag and suggested
topics of potential interest for SBG3, we had hoped
that this theme would produce many submissions and
spur lively discourse on them. We had also hoped that
some of the submissions would suggest answers to the
problems and conflicts that cultural lags produce in
contemporary social institutions and speculate on how
problems and conflicts resulting from cultural lag might
be prevented or solved.
In the description for this volume, we included a list
of possible topics about which potential contributors
could write. These topics included ways to prepare
human beings to accept transformative innovations
more smoothly and, thus, reduce the disruptive
experience of cultural lag; using robots not only to
do factory work but also in offices and as caretakers
to the elderly and infirm; exploring the advent, likely
use, and consequences of autonomous (self-driving)
cars; analyses of the effects of e-books and digital
learning tools for reading and education; exploring
how individuals who are not conversant in the digital
technologies available today navigate and live in an
increasingly digital world; and analyses of whether and
how the spread of digital communication, including
social media, enhances or diminishes the quality of
people’s lives. We listed only some of the possibilities.
SBG4 and future volumes will offer contributors
the opportunity to continue to send in submissions
on the theme of cultural lag as well as on one of the
other themes addressed in SBG1 (on adoption) and
SBG2 (on livable communities). Potential contributors
interested in cultural lag may choose to write about one
of the topical areas listed in the description for SBG3 or
another topic related to cultural lag. The Editorial Board
of SBG remains interested in receiving submissions on
other topics viewed by the author(s) as neglected and/
or forgotten in mainstream sociology journals.
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Film Review of “Robot & Frank”
By
Emily Stier Adler
“Robot & Frank” (2012) is a film set a small town in
upstate New York in the near future. Frank, the main
character, is played by Frank Langella in a sympathy
generating performance. Frank is an almost retired
career burglar who is experiencing memory loss.
Neither of his children lives nearby. Frank’s daughter,
Madison, works in remote places around the world and
keeps in touch digitally via a kind of FaceTime. His son,
Hunter, routinely drives the five hours to his father’s
house to deliver food and check on him. Absent but
concerned, they keep tabs on Frank as best they can but
are considering other residential options for him.
The other main character in the film is the unnamed
robot that Hunter brings for Frank to help him continue
to live independently. Frank’s robot is a personal
assistant robot. Another service robot in the film is Mr.
Darcy, the “worker” in the library who does most of the
library work. While she seems to accept the robot, the
town librarian, played by Susan Sarandon, must cope
with a world in which print material is being replaced
by digital data. In fact, Frank is her only remaining
customer as his walk to the library is one of his few
continuing activities in addition to reading printed
books. The film’s narrative focuses on the relationship
that develops between Frank and his robot as well as on
Frank’s personal and family history.	

adaptive technologies are among the environmental
modifications that may be used by those with declining
physical or cognitive abilities. However, the theory
points to concerns about the “digital divide” when
changes in technology outpace changes in nonmaterial
dimensions (Binstock et al. 2011, p. 259). Forced to live
with the robot as an alternative to being placed in the
memory care unit of a nursing home, Frank initially
exhibits difficulties in adapting to the new technology
because the robot interferes with his life and habits.
We see that the cantankerous Frank is grumpy when
his new servant, the robot, changes his diet to a healthy
one, insists on creating daily routines including walks for
exercise, and encourages new hobbies such as planting a
vegetable garden. Many aspects of the depiction of the
elderly Frank and his family are accurate. As is typical
of the children of the elderly, Frank’s son is concerned
about Frank’s safety and concentrates on eliminating
risks from his father’s life. Hunter notes the messy house,
Frank’s inability to shop and cook for himself, and his
memory declines, like forgetting that his favorite local
restaurant has closed, and Frank asking Hunter “How’s
Princeton?” thinking that Hunter, near 40, is still an
undergraduate.

After many long trips from his house to his father’s,
Hunter buys a robot to help Frank out. However, good
Sociologist William Ogburn’s (1966) concept of breakfasts and a clean house are not what matter most to
cultural lag hypothesized that non-material culture Frank. Rather, Frank’s priorities are what Atul Gawande
tends to resist change or to change at a slower pace (2014) argues are most important to the elderly -than material culture. The culture is expected to adapt independence and the ability to live a meaningful
to fit new conditions and, as a result, the lag between life. Only Hunter can program, or turn off, the robot.
the non-material and material produces challenges for That fact is symbolic of Frank’s loss of independence.
individuals and social structures.
Because Frank is not the one in control of the robot, he
has, therefore, lost control of his own life.
Modernization theory, as used by gerontologists,
has been refined to focus on aspects of material culture
However, Frank soon realizes that the robot can be
such as technology. Modernization theory specifies that trained to help with a series of burglaries and begins to
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appreciate his new companion. In doing so, he learns
to adapt to this new technology. Encouraged by the
robot’s statement that it is not programmed to consider
the legality of its actions, Frank decides to return to
his former “profession.” Planning heists and then
successfully completing them with robot’s help, Frank
illustrates the continuity theory of successful aging.
Continuity theory (Atchley 1989) holds that older adults
attempt to preserve and maintain existing internal and
external structures by using strategies tied to their past
experiences of themselves and their social world. We see
Frank adapt to the robot and its place in his life by using
the robot as his burglary assistant; thereby producing
continuity in his inner psychological characteristics
and his social behavior. With each heist, Frank’s activity
level and interest in the world increase which results in
dramatic improvements in his physical and cognitive
abilities. Viewers of this movie also observe the growing
bond between Frank and the robot.

31
affluent and/or highly education seniors are responsible
for the recent growth in technology adoption with 58%
of those over 65 saying technology has had a mostly
positive impact on society (Pew 2017).
Seniors increased use of technology and their view
that it has a positive impact on their lives may be
indicators of the culture catching up to the technology.
Seniors of the future may have an easier time welcoming
robots into their homes than Frank did initially. The
engineers tell us that robots are here to stay and that
their functionality is improving all the time (Clotet et.
al 2016). The demographics of the near future may tilt
the ratio of caretakers from mostly human to mostly
machine. By 2020, for the first time in history, the
number of older people will outnumber the number of
children younger than 5 years of age and In the next 25
years, the number of people older than 65 will double
(Das, 2015). As the film’s director, Jake Schreier notes:

“From my perspective . . . the question is not ‘human
Estimates indicate that 5% to 7% of those over 65,
or machine?’ It’s ‘nothing or machine.’ I visited my
and nearly 30% of those over 85, suffer from dementia,
grandmother, who has Alzheimer’s, maybe twice in the
a disease characterized by progressive and generally
past three years. I’m not there. My family does a much
irreversible loss in mental capabilities that may include
better job but she still lives in Florida. So if this is the way
confusion, memory loss and disorientation (Singh and
it’s going to go, if we’re not going to be bringing the elderly
Upadhyay 2014). Despite his occasional confusion,
into our own homes any more, why not hire a robot?”
Frank does remember how to pick a lock, case a building,
(Shoard 2013).
and deactivate alarms. Such memories demonstrate
his long term-memory still functions. However, while
Frank clearly feels attraction to and affection for LITERATURE CITED
Jennifer, the librarian, he does not remember that she
was his wife until they divorced 30 years before. While Atchley, R. C. 1989. “A Continuity Theory of Normal Aging.”
Gerontologist 29:183-90.
long term memory is affected by advanced dementia,
in the beginning stages, people typically remember
Binstock, R. H., George, L. K., Cutler, S. J., Hendricks, J.
significant individuals and events in their earlier lives.
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George, L. and Ferraro, K. (Eds.). London: Academic Press.

To understand the extent of the cultural gap
concerning the use of robots, consider the data on seniors
and technology. The most recent Pew Research Center
report (2017) on tech adoption among older adults finds Clotet, E., Martinez, D., Moreno, J., Tresanchez, M., and
Palacin, J. 2016. “Assistant Personal Robot (APR):
that they are moving towards more digitally-connected
Conception and Application of a Tele-Operated Assisted
lives. Almost half (42%) of those over 65 now own smart
Living Robot.” Sensors 16: 610-633.
phones up from just 18% in 2013. Two thirds of seniors
use the internet and half have broadband in their homes
(Pew 2017). However, there are important differences Das, R. 2015. “A Silver Tsunami Invades The Health Of
Nations.” Forbes. Retrieved July 21, 2016. (https://www.
between the young old (under 75) and the oldest old
forbes.com/sites/reenitadas/2015/08/11/a-silver-tsunami(over 85). Eighty two percent of those 65 to 69 go online
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while only 44% of those over 80 do; 59% of the former
own smart phones compared to 17% of the later. Among
the older population as a whole, the younger, relatively
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Film Review of "The Circle"
By
Helmut E. Reinhardt & Josephine A. Ruggiero
Based on the 2013 book of the same name by Dave
Eggers, the film “The Circle”(released on 4/28/17) is
similar to a sci-fi piece with a heavy dose of reality.
Although the viewer’s take on this movie will likely
be affected by generational differences, there are some
chilling moments for older viewers who were raised
in an era where privacy was much more valued than
it appears to be today. This movie explores what can
go wrong and what can go right for society in light of
advancing technological changes, their consequences,
and implications. The central issues “The Circle” covers
are complete and unfettered transparency of behavior
in a “no secrets” society where people are encouraged,
and are willing, to give up their privacy. The complete
invasion of privacy even extends to installing cameras
in bathroom stalls.

her co-workers and friends. Unfortunately, with good
intentions, Mae shows the circle of friends and the
world, a chandelier her friend, Mercer Medeiros created,
made of antlers discarded by reindeers after the mating
season. Comments were made by viewers who did not
know Mercer, or how he got the deer antlers, that he was
an animal killer. Another downside of having cameras
everywhere, including in Mae’s parents’ home, was her
inadvertent entry into her parents’ bedroom while they
were being intimate.

All of these sound like initiatives which can have
positive implications. However, even with a seemingly
good idea like SoulSearch, things can and do go very
wrong. For example, when Mae is pressed to locate
Mercer, played by Ellar Coltrane (who has chosen to
go off the grid to work), she agrees reluctantly to an
Mae Holland, played by Emma Watson, is drawn into experiment at the request of the audience to find him.
this circle, a working-living community based loosely on Within a short period of time, Mercer, who did not
the Apple campus. Through a friend who works at the want to be found, was located at a wooded cabin. He
Circle, Mae is hired as a customer service representative was hounded by drones, cameras, probes, and people in
there. This is a full-time job that she really wants to cars until he met his demise driving off a bridge.
keep. For some reason, perhaps because of her youthful
enthusiasm, Mae attracts the attention of Eamon Bailey,
But the main message of the film is for Mae to allow
one of the Circle’s founders, played by Tom Hanks. As complete transparency of her daily routines to everyone,
the movie progresses, Mae becomes closer to the inner including the leaders of the Circle. However, the same
circle where important decisions are made.
rules about secrets do not apply to the founders. Toward
the end of the movie, Mae reveals to the world that they
Movie viewers learn about a series of initiatives also had dark secrets. Very telling is the statement by
developed by the Circle. These initiatives include the other founder of the Circle, Tom Stenton, played
SeaChange, having cameras positioned everywhere by Patton Oswalt, to Eamon Bailey, “We’re f-----”. The
even on the ocean, interlinking family history with implication is no one is immune, not even those at the
medical advances and SoulSearch, a tool for finding top. No more secrets, no more back room deals or no
both lost family and friends and locating criminals more dirty deals.
who have gone “off the grid.”
Currently, societies (mostly the more developed
In the first initiative, Mae agrees to wear a camera countries with links to technology) are in the beginning
during the day (similar to the movie “Truman” starring stages of “The Circle,” but the less developed countries
Jim Carrey) and let the world see her interacting with lag behind those already developed. Even Europe is
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only about 25% “connected.” Europeans in general still
value privacy, direct interpersonal relations, and a less,
hectic world. For example, few of Helmut’s cousins in
Europe have computers, cell phones, or mobile devices,
citing cost and the “trivialization of daily life” (e.g., got
to know, got to ask about everything, including what I
or you had for breakfast). The worst downside of “The
Circle” is the overload on everyone’s life, the complete
encompassing of a “Knowing-Everything Society.” Even
without our permission, others are posting private
information about us on the internet. Whether we like
it or not, our personal identities no longer exist.
________________
About the Reviewers: Helmut E. Reinhardt, M. Ed, is
a frequent contributor to Sociology between the Gaps
(SBG). In addition to founding and serving as Editor in
Chief of SBG, Josephine A. Ruggiero, Ph.D., Professor
Emerita of Sociology, is a specialist in the field of social
change and futurist issues. She developed and taught
courses in social change during her four-decades long
undergraduate teaching career.
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This section contains items whose aim is to supplement the articles and other work published in this volume of
Sociology between the Gaps. We hope you enjoy reading them.
Implications of the Transportation Revolution
This commentary is an addendum to the article
entitled “The Advent of Autonomous Vehicles: A
Transportation Revolution” which I published in
this volume. In that article I wrote about the coming
autonomous vehicles. Here I want to comment further
on the possible implications of these vehicles. In my
previous article, I mentioned that, with the increasing
cost of autonomous vehicles, fewer vehicles will be on
the road. One implication is that more people will take
ride-sharing vehicles (i.e., taxis, limousines, Lufft, Uber,
for example) or enter into car-sharing ownership with
others. With fewer vehicles, fewer parking spaces would
be needed. Fewer parking spaces could translate into
more useable real estate. There will be other changes
in societies as result of the transportation revolution.
Below I explore seven categories of possible changes
related to innovations in transportation.

Another proposal to change the housing industry is
the existence of autonomous houses. According to Doug
Davis, senior VP of Intel’s Automated Driving Group,
people could see “an evolution of RV’s into autonomous
houses and nomadic communities that follow work
patterns.”1 This brave new world of the future would
become a truly mobile one. With the need of labor being
sent to do specific jobs in other parts of a country, the
demographics of nations would shift dramatically. For
example, if the Las Vegas area needs more laborers or
employees for business, then these mobile communities
would be summoned to fulfill the labor need.

Changes in city/large town planning: In a sort
of return to the past in the future, large metropolises
could become decentralized into smaller manageable,
self-sustaining entities with all the necessary services
to be self-sufficient. For example, these smaller entities
would have local pharmacies, doctor and lawyer offices,
butchers, shoemakers, tailors, corner grocery stores,
Changes in the housing industry: With autonomous crafts people and other specialty trades.
vehicles, anyone-- even older seniors and those either
handicapped or disabled, can “drive” these remarkable
Small forgotten and abandoned towns throughout
innovations. Seniors can live in their own homes the country could be repurposed into self-sustaining
independently much longer than at present. There communities. Larger cities, like New York City, for
would, therefore, be less demand on independent living example, would be broken into five boroughs, each
arrangements or even assisted living, if seniors can get operating independently. Residents would use either
medical services at home. This, in turn, would contribute mass transportation or autonomous vehicles for distance
to the development of livable, inter-dependent travel to surrounding communities. I wrote about this
communities, e.g., seniors living together (along with model in SBG2 in the article entitled, “Reinforcing The
younger people or even relatives) in a housing complex Values of The Village In Urban Settings.”
which provides medical and other support services.
These livable communities would help seniors with
Changes in occupations: Gone will be truck drivers,
social, economic, and housing issues. The proliferation since the trucking industry will be managed by driverless
of livable communities would, in turn, minimize the vehicles. These vehicles, in turn, would be dispatched
number and size of the independent/assisted living by computers not humans. The trucking industry
facilities throughout the country and reduce the cost to will have to re-invent itself into a kind of an Amazon
1
Medicare and Medicaid.
What’s the Autonomy Economy? 2017. Car and Driver (November: 088).

organization. Fleets of trucks can be used for crosscountry commerce and would be segregated from noncommercial autonomous vehicles. These robo-trucks
would operate day or night. Some federal regulation
must be made for hours of operation and could operate
on alternative fuels, such as natural gas.
Occupations yet to be determined will emerge, mostly
in the IT field. Occupations displaced by autonomous
vehicles or by computers may become a new class of
"unemployables." This category could be short-term or
long-term depending on the opportunities to learn new
skills such as starting a small business or becoming part
of a cooperative. In either case, people “in transition” to
a new occupation or career should likely be paid more
than people on welfare.
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Part II and III.” Flying locomotives, however, such as in
the movie, “Back to the Future, Part III,” can be a bit of
stretch of our imagination. Flying cars, fueled on fuelcells or other alternative energies, will be here in 2020,
but changes in FAA regulations will likely lag behind for
many years. I also think new occupations may emerge
in time from the development of these alternative
energies.

Changes in vehicle size: Vehicles would become
smaller and more compact. Autos without drivers
could carry two to six people; buses would be smaller,
similar to mini vans; and trucks can be either very large
(similar to the present day “trains” of Australia, which
criss-cross the continent through the Outback) or
small “robotrucks.” These driverless vehicle “would reprogram the time/cost optimization of travel” and thus,
Changes in secondary and post-secondary would eliminate regional air travel. A businessman could
education: Vocational high schools will become more use an autonomous vehicle instead of air shuttles to go
useful for the general population in training students to a distant city and spend productive time working in
for computer technology and repair and for various these vehicles while traveling or catching up on sleep or
trades. With the innovation of autonomous vehicles, just socializing with fellow passengers.2
auto mechanics will be a highly specialized and skilled
field. Autonomous vehicles will become computers
Businesses would have their own autonomous fleet
on wheels. In the future, autonomous vehicles may be vehicles to deliver their goods, thus eliminating some
able to self-diagnose glitches and problems, such as delivery companies, such as FedEx. Companies, like
viruses. Gone will be the corner Mom and Pop garage. United States Postal Service, may have to change their
Thus, human technicians may even become obsolete. focus to accommodate their delivery of goods and
Because of the higher level skill sets required, children services. Competition from drone-based companies
may start a form of regular public schooling sooner than may also be a big concern.
they do at present-- at age three rather than at age five.
Instructors at all educational levels would need to be reChanges in the legal profession and in policing:
trained to fit the needs of the advanced technologies. Autonomous vehicles are controlled by computers,
Also, studying the liberal arts in colleges would be sensors, and radar. Thus, vehicles will not go over speed
a luxury reserved for the wealthy like the finishing limits, drive recklessly, make judgment errors, text or
schools of the past and for those older adults who have interfere with regulations of the road. The legal field
the desire to learn these enrichment subjects and have may shift in focus to liability issues. What happens if
leisure time at their disposal. Colleges and universities there is an accident due to glitches or problems with the
would shift to specialized fields, such as pre-law, pre- computers within these vehicles? The manufacturers
med, and business and finance.
of these autonomous vehicles must insure themselves
against claims. There would also be a shift in policing on
Changes in alternative energy sources: Vehicles of the road. Police, both local and state, would concentrate
the future will be running on natural gas, non-petro on crimes and not to police roadway violations, such
oils, electric, even solar or fuel-cell. The environment as distracted driving, regulation violations, and road
would become cleaner. Dependency on fossil fuels will rage. No more state or local police hiding behind signs
be a thing of the past, because fossil fuels will not be or bridges.
used for the operation of autonomous vehicles and
more for maintenance of these vehicles. There is also 2
How Would Level 5 Cars Change Our Lives? 2017. Car and
the possibility of a low-grade, nuclear-fueled vehicle, Driver (November: 085).
such as the vehicle in the movies, “Back to the Future,

Etcetera
In conclusion, the transportation revolution will
have a far-reaching effect on our world in the very near
future. From the housing industry to the educational
field; from the trucking industry to the business world,
our way of life will be changed dramatically. We must
adapt to the challenges of these changes with changes
in the sphere of non-material culture. New regulations
and laws will need to be created to accommodate our
ever changing world.
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either a steering wheel or gas and brake pedals (Hawkins
2018a).

General Motors, once the largest automobile
company in the world, also plans to introduce an
autonomous vehicle without a steering wheel or pedals.
Using fourth-generation electric Chevrolet Bolts, the
primary use of this vehicle will be for ride-sharing and
a taxi service. Currently, third-generation Bolts are
being used on a trial basis on streets of San Francisco
References
and Phoenix. The trial basis has been deemed fairly
successful, with only six crashes in September 2017
“How Would Level 5 Cars Change Our Lives?” 2017. (both fault and no fault by these vehicles). GM was able
Car and Driver (November): 085.
to roll out this innovation because of their acquisition
of Cruise Automation and LIDAR start-up Strobe.
“What’s the Autonomy Economy?” 2017. Car and Driver With innovations coming rapidly to various car shows
(November):088.
(traditional roll-out of forthcoming models), the federal
government finds itself in a state of cultural lag because
*
*
many of these new vehicles do not meet federal safety
standards. For example, because of the lack of steering
This piece was written by Helmut E. Reinhardt, a controls, a passenger airbag must be substituted for the
volunteer instructor for AARP’s Safe Driver courses.
driver airbag on these new GM ride-sharing vehicles.
GM needs to seek exemptions from the Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards in order to be able to even
road-test these new vehicles (Hawkins 2018b).
Driving into the Future
Waymo, self-driving unit of Google Alphabet, will
Many companies are getting on the bandwagon of also launch their first commercial driver-less, ridemass producing autonomous vehicles. As recently sharing service in Phoenix, AZ, but with a steering wheel
as December 2017, a number of big and small and pedals (for emergency or backup use). According
manufacturing companies have started to unveil plans to Hawkins (2018c), Waymo is also test-driving these
to produce autonomous vehicles with, and without, minivans in San Francisco and Atlanta. Waymo has
announced that they have already tested these vans in
steering wheels and pedals.
24 cities throughout the country, including Austin, TX,
By 2019, Ford Motor Company, one of the oldest Detroit, MI, and Kirkland, WA.
car manufacturers in America, will unveil plans for
In Las Vegas, a Mercedes Smart Vision EQ is making
an autonomous vehicle, which “talks” to everything-e.g., street lights, smart phones (in the pockets of its appearance. This vehicle has a different approach.
pedestrians and bicyclists), other non-autonomous Achieving a top speed of 12 mph, the Mercedes Smart
and semi-autonomous vehicles. When this happens, Vision EQ has room for just passengers. It is piloted
remotely by a nearby human. Since there is no center
transportation will start to take a leap into the future.
console and steering controls, the vehicle’s interior is
Ford is actively pursuing several other initiatives roomy. The dashboard has navigation and a few social
partnering with Qualcomm to install a V2X cellular media posts to entertain passengers. The vehicle has a
technology into its vehicles; with Domino’s and Lyfft; “kill-switch” in case something goes wrong (O’Kane
and with a delivery startup company called Postmates. 2018).
The objective of the Ford Motor Company is to make
The Consumer Electronics Show (CES) in Las Vegas
money off of the idea of driver-less vehicles. In addition,
has
showcased a Toyota with an E-Palette concept which
by 2021, Ford plans to manufacture a vehicle without
makes it essentially a box on wheels. These vehicles can
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be transformed to suit the needs of the company that _____. 2018e. “Lyfft and Aptiv Extend Their Self-Driving
buys them. Amazon or FedEx may turn it into a delivery
Taxi Pilot in Las Vegas.” www.theverge. (1/22).
vehicle. A flower shop may use the vehicle to transport
flowers. This “concept vehicle” is next-generation battery- Nicol, Will. 2018. “At CES 2018, Autonomous Cars
electric and is fully autonomous (Nichol 2018).
Took The Wheel And Drove Into The Future.” Digital
Trends. (1/11).
Voyage, a startup company, is introducing selfdriving taxis to the Villages retirement community in O’Kane, Sean. 2018. “I Rode in the Mercedes Concept
Orlando, FL (Hawkins 2018d). These taxis will have
Car That Shut Down the Las Vegas Strip.” www.
traditional controls. Voyage has operated the same selftheverge. (1/11).
driving vehicles in the San Jose, CA Villages community
and is offering senior citizens in San Jose and Orlando
*
*
an equity stake in the Voyage company as a bonus
for participating in the experiment. Determining the Written by Helmut E. Reinhardt, AARP Smart Driver
effectiveness of this incentive with senior citizens will Program Instructor.
require further research.
Lastly, self-driving taxis, operated by Lyfft and Aptiv,
will extend their trial period in Las Vegas. Lyfft is
working on a program for Boston. As demonstrated in
the 2018 Consumer Electronic Show (CES), these taxis
provided the show attendees tickets for free rides of up
to 400 miles of transportation to 20 pre-programmed
destinations throughout the Las Vegas area. The rating
of 4.5+ (out of 5) from attendees who took the free
rides is very positive feedback. In my opinion, the
CES illustrated the rapid pace of innovations in the
autonomous vehicle realm. Government regulations
have not kept pace. If regulations do not catch up with
the pace of change, there is the risk that this lag will
hinder more technological changes now and in the
future.
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